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THE LEGACY OF K'OREMATSU V UNI7TED SATES:
A DANGEROUS NARRATIVE RETOLD
Dean Masaru Hashimotot
PROLOGUE
My family never discussed in any detail the internment of my father during
World War II until my involvement in the relitigation of Korematsu v. United States'
as a law student in the summer of 1982. I remember as a child and adolescent
possessing a vague understanding that my father had been incarcerated in a camp in
the Midwest, but that episode in his life remained outside general family discussion.2
The only persisting references in our home to the Japanese internment were wooden
picture carvings that hung in our hallway. The graceful and detailed carvings were
of animals and people, all of whom had Japanese eyes. My paternal grandfather had
sculpted them while he was in the internment camp. He died when I was young, so
I never had the chance to listen to the stories behind those hand-carved pictures.
Consequently, my early knowledge of the Japanese internment developed from
sources outside my family. One source was school. In particular, I remember viv-
idly the summer of 1971, when I was in a public high school class in American
history. One day, the class had been assigned reading about World War II, includ-
ing one or two paragraphs about the Japanese internment. I remember that the text
described the internment in rather neutral terms, not expressing any remorse about
the episode. The teacher typically lectured, but occasionally he asked for volunteers.
I will never forget my shock that day when the teacher called on me in class-
although I had not volunteered-and challenged me with the question: "Was the
internment of the Japanese the right thing to do in World War II?" I wanted to say
no, but could not articulate why, so I told him instead that I was not sure. I remem-
ber blushing and feeling ashamed of my answer. My teacher said that the intern-
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ment had been the right thing to do because it worked and, after all, it was war. At
the time, I did not challenge his thesis, but I felt perplexed and uncomfortable.
Years later, I did challenge his views when I became involved in the relitigation
of the Korematsu case. Fred Korematsu sought to vacate his criminal conviction,
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1944, for disobeying General John
DeWitt's order, which barred him from his home in San Leandro, California.
Nearly 40 years after his conviction, Korematsu filed a petition of coram nobis based
upon governmental misconduct. 3 In 1982, a congressional commission exposed the
governmental misconduct and concluded that, at the time of the internment order,
substantial credible evidence from federal, civilian, and military agencies contra-
dicted General DeWitt's view that military necessity justified internment of all per-
sons of Japanese ancestry.4 The commission found that there had not been military
necessity; the causes of the internment were racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a
failure of political leadership. 5
The relitigation of the Korematsu case resulted in a victory for Fred Korematsu.
The government did not attempt to contradict his allegations of governmental mis-
conduct; in fact, the government urged the court to vacate the conviction and to
dismiss the underlying indictment.6 However, the government did challenge the
petitioner's attempt to have a hearing on the merits of his allegations of governmen-
tal misconduct. 7 The government also argued that a published opinion by the judge
was unnecessary.8 Given its agreement to vacate the conviction, the government's
opposition to a hearing and a written judicial opinion may seem insignificant.
However, the petitioner and the Japanese American community felt strongly about
both articulating the exact wrongs committed by the internment and getting sup-
porting documents of those wrongs into evidence.
9
District Court Judge Marilyn Patel granted Korematsu's motion and allowed
his legal team to present the evidence in an open hearing. The evidence submitted
established that the Justice Department had suppressed information from govern-
mental sources that contradicted the Army's assertion that the Japanese American
community represented a national defense risk.1 ° Both the public hearing and the
court's announcement of its decision were heavily attended by the Japanese Ameri-
can community in San Francisco. These court dates served as a means of expression
and catharsis for pent-up emotions, especially for the issei and nisei."1 When Judge
Patel announced her decision to overturn Korematsu's criminal conviction and her
determination to publish her opinion, many in the courtroom wept and hugged one
another.
3. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1409. A writ of coram nobis seeks to correct errors in criminal
convictions in which other remedies are not available. Id. at 1411.
4. See GEORGE MILLER, COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
102D CONG., 2D SESS., PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 88-92 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED]; see also Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
5. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 18; see also Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1416-17.
6. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1410.
7. See id.
8. See Philip Tajitsu Nash, Korematsu's Wartime Conviction Vacated, 112 N.J. L.J. 651 (1983).
9. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED 21-23 (1989) [hereinafter IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED].
10. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1418-19.
11. See IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED supra note 9, at 24-26. The Japanese terms used by Japanese Ameri-
cans naming the generations include: issei are the immigrant generation; the first generation born in the
United States are nisei; and the second generation born here, sansei. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra
note 4, at 31.
19961
UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL
Judge Patel's pronouncement was part of a basic transformation in how the
American society views, and speaks about, the Japanese internment. The old narra-
tives included silence in the families of issei and nisei, statements like those made by
my high school teacher, and the government's opposition to having an open hearing
and a published judicial opinion. The new narratives include conversations within
Japanese American families about the internment experiences and its aftermath; the
congressional report, Personal Justice Denied, 2 which officially dispelled the myth
that there was a military necessity; and Judge Patel's declaration that Krematsu
"stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and
national security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scru-
tiny and accountability." 1 3 The new narratives also include the proclamation by
President Gerald Ford that the evacuation was wrong, and President Ronald Rea-
gan's decision to sign the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, providing restitution for and
acknowledgment of the fundamental injustice of the internment.14
I shared in the celebration of these new narratives and was transformed by
them. Yet whenever I teach Korematsu in my constitutional law classes, I feel some
of the uneasiness and bewilderment about it that I experienced as a high school
student when I failed to answer my teacher's question to his satisfaction. Today, a
different question haunts me: Could something similar to the Japanese internment
happen again in this country? I wish I could honestly say that the answer is "no," or
even that I am not sure. But I fear the answer is a resounding "yes" because, as
Judge Patel acknowledged in her decision in the 1984 relitigation of Korematsu's
criminal conviction, she could only correct factual errors; she had no power to over-
turn the legal principles underlying the 1944 Korematsu decision.' 5 "Thus, the
Supreme Court's decision [in 1944] stands as the law of this [1984] case and for
whatever precedential value it may still have." The reason I write this Article is my
concern that while public narratives about the Japanese internment have changed
markedly, the Korematsu case remains consistent with modern legal doctrines and
may lead to repetition of similar governmental actions.
INTRODUCTION
Just over fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court handed down the
decision of Korematsu v. United States,'6 upholding the constitutionality of a military
order in World War II that initiated the internment of citizens of Japanese ances-
try. 17 The mass internment of citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry be-
gan in March 1942 in response to President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order
12. See supra note 4.
13. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
14. See LEWIs FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250-52
(1992).
15. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
16. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
17. The Japanese internment has inspired considerable interest by historians. Excellent historical refer-
ences include ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS: NORTH AMERICAN JAPANESE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA DURING WORLE; WAR 11 (1971); RICHARD DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION
CAMPS: DILLON S. MYER AND AMERICAN RACISM (1987); AUDRIE GIRDNER & ANNE LoFIS, THE GREAT
BETRAYAL: THE EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II (1969); MORTON
GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION (1949); SANDRA C. TAYLOR,
JEWEL OF THE DESERT (1993). For a revisionist view of the internment that tends to emphasize its positive
aspects, see PAGE SMITH, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RELOCATION
IN WORLD WAR II (1995).
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9066.18 The President's Executive Order gave to the Secretary of War and other
military commanders the power to exclude for the sake of national security all per-
sons of Japanese ancestry from designated areas.19 It was conceived by General John
DeWitt, military commander for the western states, who reported an imminent
threat of sabotage and espionage posed by persons of Japanese ancestry. Congress
ratified the mass internment program by passing a law that criminalized violations of
the military orders.2" The internment lasted, at least for some, until 1946.21 Ap-
proximately 120,000 people, including 70,000 American citizens, were deported to
ten relocation camps scattered across the West.22
My father, Ben Masaru Hashimoto, who was at the time a nisei attending
college in California's Central Valley, recalled in his memoirs:
On that well-known day, December 7, 1941 .... after having breakfast at
9:30 a.m., I rested in my bed; whereupon, I heard the electrifying news about the
bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese planes. The shocking news was hardly
believable at first; then, I thought, surely, they [the Japanese] are crazy and are
committing suicide because I could not conceive of any way in which our enemy
could win the war against the mighty United States with its tremendous
resources.
23
The attack, my father went on to say,
had an immediate impact upon all people of Japanese ancestry in the United
States. Newspapers and radio broadcasts spread the hate propaganda to whip up
everyone's effort toward winning the war. News media were even differentiating
the physical attributes of the Japanese as against the other Orientals, so that they
could be targeted for hatred.24
Military orders required my father to leave his home and enter custody at a
local fairgrounds. "The official name of the camp was the Merced Assembly Center,
although in truth it had all the properties of a concentration camp," 25 he wrote.
There were high barbed fences surrounding the entire area; tall guard posts
with search lights were erected in several places; and soldiers had orders to shoot to
kill anyone attempting to escape. Most internees were American citizens who had
committed no crime, were not given any trial, and yet were imprisoned like con-
victed felons. 2
6
Military authorities later required that my father be transported by train to the
Amache Relocation Center in the desert of southeastern Colorado. In this and simi-
18. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 49. General John DeWitt recommended the mass
internment to the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who in turn persuaded President Roosevelt to issue the
executive order. See id. at 6.
19. See id. at 2.
20. See id. at 99. Korematsu was convicted under Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Star. 173,
repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 868 (reenacted as 18 U.S.C. § 1383, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 94-412, tit. V, § 501(e), 90 Stat. 1258 (1976)).
21. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 490 (1945).
22. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 135, 150; PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 297, 365
(1983) [hereinafter IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR].
23. Ben M. Hashimoto, Journey from the Grandstand of the Past to the Grandstand of the Present 1-2
(Feb. 18, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The internment inspired Japanese Americans
to write about their experiences. See, e.g., AKEMI KIKIMURA, THROUGH HARSH WINTERS: THE LIFE OF A
JAPANESE IMMIGRANT WOMAN (1981); RONALD TAKAiM, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 379-405
(1989); MITSUYE YAMADA, CAMP NOTES AND OTHER POEMS (1976). For a discussion of the role of autobi-
ography in law and narrative scholarship, see Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal Story: Privilege,
Authenticity, "Blunders, " and Transfrrmation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA. L. REV. 69 (1996).
24. Hashimoto, supra note 23, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1.
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lar camps, people settled in barracks. Entire families were forced to live in single
rooms, regardless of family size.2 7 Privacy and furnishings were minimal, and eating
and bathing took place in mass facilities.2 8
The internment not only inflicted widescale emotional and physical hardship,
but it also caused incalculable financial harm. Some families destroyed anything
that might be construed as a tie to Japan, including art, books, pictures, and cloth-
ing. Many Japanese Americans were forced to sell their homes, farms, and cars at
"fire-sale" prices in the short time-often as little as a week-between notification
of internment and their entry into the camps.29
When World War II began, nearly half of the Japanese Americans on the Pa-
cific coast were farmers. As a result of hard work and frugal living over many years,
the Japanese Americans had dominated the wholesale and retail markets for fruits
and vegetables in California. 31 After the internment order, millions of dollars worth
of crops were left standing in the fields; this investment was altogether lost. Like-
wise, equipment was abandoned where it stood or sold off for a fraction of its value.
In a typical case, a farmer was forced to take seventy-five dollars for a tractor that he
had bought several months earlier for ten times that amount.3 1
Small business owners were similarly exploited. A Japanese American woman
approached a government official and told him she had been offered five hundred
dollars for her twenty-six room hotel and that she had just three days to decide.
"Three days later, she came to me in tears, frustrated and frightened," 32 noted the
official; she had been forced to accept the offer. "People who were like vultures
swooped down on us, going through our belongings, offering us a fraction of their
value,"3 3 a Japanese American homeowner recalled. "When we complained to them
of the low price they would respond by saying, 'you can't take it with you so take it
or leave it."' 3
4
During times of war, citizens must bear tremendous costs and burdens; indeed,
sometimes they even surrender their lives. So was the nation's treatment of Japanese
Americans so intolerable in view of wartime exigency? Part I examines the constitu-
tional analysis considering this question in Korematsu v. United States.3' Declaring
that "hardships are part of war,"'36 the Court upheld a military order that excluded
persons of Japanese ancestry from designated coastal areas. The Court began, how-
ever, by noting that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect ... [and] courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny." 37 But it ultimately relied on the precedent set by United States v.
Hirabayashi,38 which upheld a similar curfew. The Court's analysis turned on
whether the military order was within the war powers of the President and Congress.
27. See id. at 8.
28. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 11.
29. See id. at 121. The most widely quoted estimate of the total losses suffered is $400 million. It is
unclear how this figure was calculated. See id. at 120.
30. See id. at 122.
31. See id. at 126.
32. Id. at 128.
33. Id. at 132.
34. Id.
35. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. at 216.
38. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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However, the Court's opinion in Korematsu has been aptly called "a muddled
hodge-podge of conflicting and barely articulate doctrine. '39 Its mixed messages
later were misinterpreted by the Court itself. The popular wisdom is that Korematsu
has been, in fact, overruled as evidenced by the criticism it has received.4" Neverthe-
less, the Court continues to cite and rely on Korematsu in modern cases. Most
recently, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,4" for example, the Court explicitly
claimed that it relied on Korematsu in overruling more recent precedent that had
applied intermediate scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs. The Court
offered two conflicting interpretations of Korematsu and described its result as "inex-
plicabl[e]." 4" In its first interpretation, the Court concluded that although it had set
forth the "most rigid scrutiny" standard in Korematsu, it "then inexplicably relied on
'the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case,"' 43 which held that the "Fifth
Amendment 'restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts
to a denial of due process."' 4 4 In this interpretation, the Court indicated that it had
not applied a strict scrutiny test in Korematsu. Later, in the same opinion, however,
the Court offered yet a different interpretation of Korematsu. The Court noted that
Korematsu has been repeatedly cited for the proposition that racial classifications
made by the federal government must be subject to strict scrutiny4 5 and concluded
that Korematsu teaches that "even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to
detect an illegitimate racial classification."4 6 The Court's second interpretation of
Korematsu assumes that it had applied strict scrutiny. Part I explores these two con-
tradictory views.
Part I also considers the role of Korematsu as legal precedent.4 7 Since the
1980s, various individuals, groups, and courts have pronounced Korematsu insignifi-
39. Jacobus tenBroek, Wartime Power of the Military Over Citizen Civilians Within the Country, 41 CAL.
L. REv. 167, 181 (1953), reprinted in THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST
FOR LEGAL REDRESS 303, 317 (Charles McClain ed., 1994).
40. See infra notes 75-79.
41. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)(overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
42. Id. at 2106.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
45. See id. at 2107.
46. Id. at 2117.
47. This Article describes how the Court interprets Korematsu in modern cases involving due process,
equal protection, and the war powers. It evaluates the Court's application of Korematsu in a number of
substantive legal areas including immigration law, affirmative action programs, racial discrimination, national
security, and pretrial detention. The Article concludes that Korematsu remains viable as precedent in these
areas and provides an explanation for its perpetuation based on analyzing the original Korematsu opinion.
This approach differs substantially from prior literature. Professor Eric Yamamoto has written a most out-
standing recent evaluation of Korematsu. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice
of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1986). Like most writers, Professor Yama-
moto focuses on Korematsu as precedent in national security law. However, he concludes, unlike many other
authorities, that Korematsu remains valid precedent in national security law and suggests that courts should
instead conduct a substantive review of governmental actions that threaten civil liberties. This Article differs
from Professor Yamamoto's approach by taking a broader perspective of the legal implications of Korematsu
and advocating a different type of interpretive approach. Professor Peter Irons studied the Japanese intern-
ment cases from a historical perspective. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 22. Professor Irons has
also written a description of the coram nobis relitigation of these cases. See IRONS, JtJSTICE DELAYED, supra
note 9. The Article makes important references to these historical materials, but takes a different view of the
Japanese internment cases by focusing on a doctrinal analysis. Sandra Takahata concludes that legal doctrines
developed subsequent to Korematsu prevent it from influencing future decisions. See Sandra Takahata, The
Case of Korematsu v. United States: Could It be Justified Today?, 6 U. HAw. L. REv. 109 (1984); see also Neil
Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of Irons, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1985).
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cant. Yet, despite declarations that Korematsu is of little precedential significance in
the modern day, the Court has not explicitly overruled it. Instead, the Court gives
Korematsu meaning in several different ways. Part I describes and criticizes the logic
of those who claim that Korematsu is no longer influential as precedent. Part I also
shows how Korematsu has been perpetuated as precedent. The Court has abandoned
its reliance on traditional stare decisis in interpreting Korematsu. Instead, it has relied
on interpretive methods that either exaggerate the amount of judicial scrutiny im-
posed or perpetuate the legal principles of Korematsu without citation to the case.
The Court also uses Korematsu based on its historical 'meaning. The Court's mod-
ern interpretation of Korematsu places more emphasis on the persuasive quality of
the case as precedent instead of confronting its logic. This rhetorical orientation
allows the legal principle contained in Korematsu to survive and flourish silently.
The modern Court's difficulty in understanding Korematsu and its distortion as
precedent had its genesis in the Korematsu Court's failure to provide a logical expla-
nation for reaching its result and choosing instead to rely on persuasive rhetoric. To
describe and explain the opinion's lack of an integrated analysis, I take a narrative-
based approach to interpreting Korematsu. 8 This technique is sensitive to the inter-
twined roles of rhetoric and logic as well as to social influences involved in the
creation of narratives and their subsequent transformations. Part II traces the origins
of the narratives incorporated into the Court's written opinion and considers other
available narratives ignored by the Court, particularly those of the parties most inti-
mately involved: Korematsu and DeWitt. Part II also describes how the Court inte-
grated and attributed meanings to the narratives contained within Korematsu. The
section next offers and analyzes a two-tiered decisionmaking model for how narra-
Several commentators wrote excellent critiques of Korematsu shortly after the Court issued the opinion.
See Rostow, supra note 21; tenBroek, supra note 39; Nanett Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military
Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945). Although
these three articles provide classic analyses of Korematsu, they do not give explanations similar to that pro-
posed in this Article for the Court's muddled and contradictory analysis. For an excellent collection of
materials about the Korematsu case and its relitigation, see THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS
AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL REDRESS (Charles McClain, ed., 1994).
Finally, scholars have also described and critiqued the reparations movement. Professor Mar Matsuda
provides a compelling analysis of the reparation movement from a critical perspective in Critical Race Theory
and Critical Legal Studies: Contestation and Coalition, in CRITICAL_ RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 63 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); see also Philip Tajitsu Nash, Moving for
Redress, 94 YALE L.J. 743 (1985).
48. For descriptions of the rich literature relating to the law and narrative movement, see Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 973-76 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412-14 (1989); Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 808-09
(1993); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feninism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1599, 1630-34 (1991); Phillip N. Meyer, Will You Please Be Quiet, Please? Lawyers Listening to the
Call of Stories, 18 VT. L. REV. 567, 569-71 (1994); see generally LAW's STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC
IN THE LAw (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds. 1996). The works of Professor James Boyd White inspired
this movement. See James Boyd White, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAw (1985).
This Article contributes to the branch of the law and narrative movement that studies legal opinions as
narratives. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 79, 85-89
(1991); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185 (1992); Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L.
REv. 871 (1986). This Article advances this literature by methodically studying the Court's changing narra-
tives about Korematsu and demonstrating that these narratives matched the public's changing perceptions
about the fairness of the Japanese internment. It furthermore shows how this dynamic mirrors the Court's
selection of narratives in the original opinion. It provides a study of the Court's silence about difficult issues
relating to race relations and how this silence has dangerous consequences.
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tives may have been selected for integration into the Court's opinion. Then, I de-
velop the idea that the Court's emphasis on choosing narratives and assigning them
meaning based on persuasive appeal, rather than on their logical relevance resulted in
the disjointed quality of the written opinion. This practice led to the failure to
establish what I term the "interpretive-narrative link"-a meaningful connection
between the narrative and the Court's rule of law. The failure to establish this link
caused the disharmony among messages within the opinion about the standard of
review imposed.
Part III explains why the Court should privilege adjudication based on the
narrative-interpretive link. This is not a call for less rhetoric; it would be naive to
deprecate its importance. Instead, this is a plea for more explicit logical connections.
The Court has excessively favored persuasive appeal over logical analysis in its use of
Korematsu as precedent. The Court should confront Korematsu when it is logically
relevant to a case. The Justices ought to provide explanation about how Korematsu is
interpreted, despite rhetorical cost. Emphasis on the importance of the interpretive-
narrative link in doctrinal interpretation would mean explicitly acknowledging Kore-
matsu's legal presence through the traditional method of stare decisis as well as
through historical interpretation. I call, however, for an abandonment of interpre-
tive methods that rely on exaggeration based on the rhetoric contained within Kore-
matsu and also for discarding those that permit reliance sub silentio. Only through
continuing public conversations about the modern-day meaning of Korematsu can its
potentially dangerous principles and rhetoric be limited effectively.
I. KWOREMIATSUAS LEGAL PRECEDENT
Part I summarizes the Korematsu opinion and traces how the Court has inter-
preted it in later cases. Many commentators contend that this is an unimportant
topic because Korematsu represents a legal precedent of little significance in the mod-
ern day. These scholars focus on the traditional use of Korematsu in stare decisis.
They tend to ignore modern interpretive techniques applied to Korematsu. While
the Court may sometimes not cite Korematsu, even when considering issues that are
closely analogous, its obvious absence raises questions about why the Court avoids
distinguishing it or declaring it overruled. Alternatively, the Court may exaggerate
the significance of Korematsu. For example, the Court frequently claims that in
Korematsu it applied strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the
fact that it clearly did not do so. Finally, the Court sometimes refers to Korematsu as
an historical example of a wrongly-decided opinion, even though it has not yet been
explicitly overruled.
A. The Court Opinion
In the traditional recital of facts at the beginning of the Korematsu opinion, the
Court49 tells us little about "[t]he petitioner." The Court neglected to mention even
his name, much less why he chose to violate the military order. The only facts
describing the petitioner, which the Court distilled from the detailed, four-page nar-
rative in the brief" submitted on behalf of the petitioner, were that he was "an
49. Justice Hugo Black delivered the Court opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Stone and by
Justices Reed, Douglas, and Rutledge. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215.
50. See Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted
in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 95, 101-05 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
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American citizen of Japanese descent" and that "[n]o question was raised as to peti-
tioner's loyalty to the United States."5 1 The Court kept the petitioner a stranger to
the reader to avoid inviting sympathy or rejection based on his racial identity.
Instead of summarizing the petitioner's narrative, the Court focused on the
crime itself and supplied a detailed analysis of its legal basis. "The petitioner ... was
convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a
'Military Area,' contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding
General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that after May 9,
1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area." 52 By
disobeying the military command, the petitioner violated "the Act of Congress, of
March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173,"' 53 which made it a criminal offense, subject to im-
prisonment or criminal fine.54 The Court then quoted, at length, the statute and
stated that the exclusion order was also "substantially based upon Executive Order
No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407."'5 5 The Court also quoted the executive order: "'the
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage
and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and na-
tional-defense utilities."' 5 6
The Court prefaced its legal analysis by stating "that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect." 57 While not
all such restrictions are unconstitutional, "courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny."58 The Court reasoned that while "[pi ressing public necessity" 59 may
serve as justification for restrictions based on racial classifications, "racial antago-
nism"60 could not. This prefatory paragraph has the appearance of an apology-
indeed, it seems out of context-as the remaining opinion went on to try to justify
the Court's unquestioning deference to the conclusions reached by military
authorities.
The Court narrowed the legal issue to the constitutionality of the military or-
der excluding persons of Japanese ancestry from the coastal area. Justice Black's
majority opinion expressly avoided deciding whether the internment was unconsti-
tutional. Thus, the orders that required detention at assembly centers and the in-
ternment at relocation camps were not considered in Korematsu: "It is sufficient here
for us to pass upon the order which petitioner violated. To do more would be to go
beyond the issues raised, and to decide momentous questions not contained within
the framework of the pleadings or the evidence in this case. " 6i Rather, the narrow
issue addressed by the Court was the constitutionality of a "temporary exclusion"
62
of persons of Japanese ancestry from a coastal area in time of emergency,
The Court found that Hirabayashi v. United States,6 3 decided more than a year
before, was directly on point because it involved the same congressional act and
51. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-16.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 216.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 216-17.
56. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 216.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 222.
62. See id. at 219.
63. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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executive order.' In Hirabayashi, the Court sustained a conviction for violation of a
curfew order that had been imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry in a coastal
area. The Court in Korematsu emphasized the narrowness of its opinion by limiting
its discussion to the first of the three issues decided in Hirabayashi,6 5 and concluded
that the exclusion based on Japanese ancestry did not exceed the war powers of
Congress and the President.6 6 The legal analysis was wholly devoted to discussing
this single issue.67 The Court acknowledged that exclusion of Korematsu from his
home was a greater deprivation of liberty than the imposition of a curfew. But, it
concluded-without providing factual support-that both the exclusion and the
curfew bore a "definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and
sabotage."68 Military authorities, acting pursuant to congressional authorization,
had determined that the "curfew provided inadequate protection" 6 9 and had thus
reasonably ordered exclusion.7"
The Court then referred by page to the part of Hirabayashi that discussed how
Congress and the President had determined, when deliberating whether to exercise
their war powers, that there was an urgent necessity to segregate based on Japanese
ancestry rather than to make individual determinations of loyalty.7 1 The Court in
Korematsu failed, however, to review or cite any particular evidence to justify the
failure to initiate individual hearings to determine if there were citizens who posed
substantial risks of involvement in sabotage or espionage.72 The only specific evi-
dence pointed to by the Court was that, based on a questionnaire distributed to
those who were interned, "[a] pproximately five thousand American citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to
renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees re-
quested repatriation to Japan. ' 73 The Court failed to note that the questionnaire
was administered about a year after the incarceration had begun and thus reflected
the resentment felt by the internees at that time toward the United States.74
Thus, the Court appeared to justify its holding based on questionnaire data
obtained after internment as well as on the Hirabayashi precedent. Furthermore, the
64. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
65. The Hirabayashi Court decided three major issues. First, it held that Congress and the President,
acting together, were within the war powers in authorizing the curfew order. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at
92-93. Second, the curfew order did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by discrim-
inating based on race. See id. at 100-02. Finally, the promulgation of the curfew order by General DeWitt
was not based on an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See id. at 102-05.
66. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
67. See id. at 217-219. After identifying the single legal issue, id. at 217-18, the Court then provided an
analysis, id. at 218-19, which shadowed the discussion in Hirabayashi, see Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96-99, on
this same point.
68. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218; see also Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96-99.
69. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
70. See id.
71. See id. ("Here, as in the Hirabayashi case,'.. we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained ... ') (citing Hirabayahi, 320 U.S. at 99). This was
the last page in the Hirabayashi opinion devoted to discussing the issue of whether the curfew order was
within the war powers of the government. The pages following were devoted to the issue of whether this
racial classification violated the equal protection requirement under the Fifth Amendment. See Hirabayashi,
320 U.S. at 99-105.
72. According to Professor Rostow, one reason for this failure was the lack of a trial record or other form
of evidence. See Rostow, supra note 21, at 509.
73. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
74. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
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Court's belief that individual suffering was inescapable in times of war pervaded the
entire opinion. After stating its holding, the Court acknowledged that, "we are not
unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens.
But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.". 5  Then,
when the Court finally identified "the petitioner" as "Korematsu" on the next-to-last
page of its opinion, it could state: "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military
Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war
with the Japanese Empire . ... "76 The Court emphasized that the war was horrible
and cruel and that many other unidentified victims were unable to plead for mercy
and justice. The Court's contextualization served to justify its conclusion that, in
this wartime situation, individuals of Japanese ancestry did not have a right to be
identified and to have their stories heard.
B. The Relationship of Korematsu to Other Internment Cases
The Court may genuinely have considered Korematsu to be a case of little sig-
nificance. After all, the Court construed Korematsu as merely reaffirming Hiraba-
yashi. The President had declared the termination of the exclusion order and an
initiation of the disbanding of the internment just prior to the Court's issuance of
Korematsu.77 Moreover, the Court announced its decision in Ex parte Endo78 the
same day it issued Korematsu. In Endo, the Court held that the continued intern-
ment of a Japanese American was unauthorized under the congressional statute that
had authorized the curfew, exclusion, and internment. The Court concluded that
because the petitioner had been ascertained to be loyal, 79 she could not be detained
while the government was attempting to obtain clearance8 ° from those areas to
which she wanted to return. The Court stated that it was narrowly construing the
statute "to allow the greatest possible accommodation between [constitutional] liber-
ties and the exigencies of war."81 Thus, the Court at the moment Korematsu was
handed down may have believed that it was a case of minor significance.
If the Korematsu Court did think that Korematsu was relatively insignificant,
this may explain some of the narrative features of its opinion. The brevity of the text
and the conclusory analysis are consistent with this interpretation. Moreover, the
overall tone of the Court opinion emphasized that it was a narrow holding, not
going "beyond the issues raised,"" E not deciding "momentous questions. '8 3 Thus,
the Court, and Justice Black in particular, may have been surprised when Korematsu
later received so much attention. It has achieved notoriety for the same reasons that
75. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
76. Id. at 223 (emphasis in original).
77. Prior to the Court's announcement of Korematsu, the Solicitor General publicly proclaimed that the
military order that required exclusion had been officially rescinded. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra
note 4, at 235. The War Department had recognized in early 1943 that military necessity could no longer
justify continuing the internment. See id. at 214. The President finally agreed to initiate the release of
internees after he was re-elected in November 1944. See id. at 232. The United States was winning the war
in the Pacific, and the danger of Japanese invasion had passed. By the time the Court announced its opinion,
the government had already decided against continuing the exclusion order. The question of its constitu-
tional legitimacy remained, however, because Korematsu appealed his criminal conviction for violating the
military order.
78. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
79. Id. at 302.
80. Id. at 292.
81. Id. at 300.
82. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
83. Id.
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may have misled the Court into thinking that it was an insignificant decision. Be-
cause Korematsu followed Hirabayashi, the Court had a second opportunity to cor-
rect what is now universally agreed to be a terrible error in judgment. The Court's
repetition of error seems even more egregious because the circumstances at the time
of Korematsu made it as easy as it could ever be in a wartime situation: in over two
years, not one person interned had been shown to be disloyal; 84 the internment was
being disbanded;8 5 and the War Department and even military authorities were con-
ceding that the internment had had no logical basis from the start.86 There was no
need to rush to judgment. For all practical purposes, the Court's opinion was moot
on the day it was issued. Yet the Court handed down a decision that is now thought
to be among its worst judgments.
Although Endo signaled the beginning of the end of the internment, the
Court's reliance on statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion meant that Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu stood for the constitutional principles emerging from the
internment cases. This result appears deliberate. In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the
Court broadly interpreted the same statute to encompass authority to issue the cur-
few and exclusion orders, despite the statute's failure to specify that these might be
done based on racial ancestry.8 7 In Endo, however, the Court rejected such a broad
approach to reading of the statute.88 The outcome in Endo allowed the perpetuation
sub silentio of the constitutional doctrine contained in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
C. The Perpetuation of Korematsu as Precedent
Korematsu remains an important influence in constitutional law. The Court
relies on several different methods in attributing meaning to Korematsu in its opin-
ions. The Court's reliance on Korematsu can be analyzed based on a decisionmaking
model. An evaluation based on this model indicates that the Court selects and uses
methods based on its perception of the persuasiveness of its interpretation of Kore-
matsu rather than its logic. This observation explains the evolving reliance on vari-
ous interpretive methods since Korematsu was decided. Most recently, the Court has
depended on methods that hide the Court's reliance on Korematsu or that put it in
an historical context.
1. Current Assessment of Korematsu s Insignificance
Popular wisdom has it that Korematsu has silently passed away as legal prece-
dent. Curiously, this view is especially supported by those who have made signifi-
cant contributions by criticizing the original decision. Forty-three years after writing
his famous article criticizing Korematsu, Professor Rostow stated, "I would submit
that Korematsu has already been overruled in fact, although the Supreme Court has
never explicitly overruled it. The case has been overruled in fact because of the
criticism it has received . "..."89 Most recently, similar pronouncements have been
made by those associated with presidential apologies, legislative restitution, and the
84. The Justice Department explicitly conceded this fact in its brief. See Brief for the United States at
18-32, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (No. 870), reprinted in 40 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 50, at 269, 296-310.
85. See supra text accompanying note 77.
86. See supra note 77.
87. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95.
88. See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).
89. Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. MiAMi L. REv. 165,
197-98 (1988) (quoting section by Professor Rostow).
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coram nobis relitigation of the Japanese internment cases. For example, the congres-
sional report, PersonalJustice Denied, declared, "Today the decision in Korematsu lies
overruled in the court of history. '"90 The report contended that subsequent case law
rendered Korematsu "a curiousity, not precedent on questions of racial discrimina-
tion" 9 1 and further claimed that "each part of the decision, questions of both factual
review and legal principles, has been discredited or abandoned."92 After his success-
ful effort in the relitigation of Korematsu, one of the co-counsel declared that the
1984 ruling "sucked away the factual underpinnings"9 3 of the 1944 case. Indeed, in
granting the coram nobis petition to vacate Fred Korematsu's conviction, Judge Patel
observed that the "Justices of [the Supreme] Court and legal scholars have com-
mented that the decision is an anachronism in upholding overt racial discrimination
as 'compellingly justified."' 9'
The celebration of the end of Korematsu's reign is premature; Korematsu lives.
To believe otherwise is to rely on the same logic that was expounded by the govern-
ment and those who opposed the relitigation of Korematsu. The Justice Department
opposed the Korematsu relitigation because it argued that subsequent precedent
made it unnecessary for courts to redecide Korematsu's relevant legal issues.95 For-
mer Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, a member of the congressional commission that
issued Personal Justice Denied, criticized the coram nobis effort as "unnecessary and
potentially damaging. "96 He contended, prior to the relitigation, that the coram
nobis effort was unnecessary because Korematsu had been overruled.97 Indeed, re-
peated public claims as to Korematsu's insignificance have been echoing ever since
the Justice Department's similar argument in the original case.
The legal arguments that Korematsu is insignificant rest on narrow, incomplete
understandings about the role of precedent in constitutional interpretation. This
conventional view construes the Court's failure to cite Korematsu, despite its rele-
vance, as overwhelming evidence that it is not influential. 9" This conventional wis-
dom assumes that the Court's practice is to state explicitly all precedent on which it
relies in its decisionmaking. Furthermore, the popular wisdom misconstrues exag-
gerated interpretations of Korematsu as benign or even helpful. Thus, it is widely
assumed that there is no danger in citing Korematsu as establishing the principle of
strict scrutiny in equal protection jurisprudence. 99 This view misapprehends the
legal context surrounding Korematsu as precedent. The conventional view relies on
the general perception that doctrinal development in constitutional law is linear and
90. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 238.
91. Id. at 239.
92. Id.
93. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 639 n.6 (12th ed. 1991).
94. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
95. See id. at 1413, 1420.
96. IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, at 13; see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the
Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HRv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 341, 341 (1990).
97. See IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, at 14.
98. In Personal Justice D nied, the commission concludes that "the Japanese American cases have never
been followed and are routinely cited as the only modern examples of invidious racial discrimination which
the Supreme Court has not stricken down." PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 239. Thus, it
concludes that Korematsu is only a "curiosity, not precedent on questions of racial discrimination." Id. Judge
Patel's opinion noted that only Hirabayashi and Korematsu have upheld the overt use of racial classifications as
constitutional and thus labeled them an "anachronism." 584 F. Supp. at 1420; see also Cooper et al., supra
note 89, at 197 (quoting section by Professor Rostow) ("Although the Supreme Court has not overruled the
case, I do not think any practicing lawyer today would cite the decision in a brief.").
99. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 239.
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forward in progression' rather than recognizing its episodic and regressive tenden-
cies. Moreover, this popular wisdom rests on pointing to subsequent favorable legis-
lation and statutory interpretation °10 and fails to recognize the preemptive power of
constitutional decisionmaking. Finally, those who believe that Korematsu has little
legal significance explain that the only reason the Court has not overruled it is for
lack of opportunity.'" 2 I demonstrate below that all these assumptions are false.
Even when presented with a recent opportunity to overrule Korematsu, the Supreme
Court instead relied on it to overrule another case.1
0 3
2. The Evolutionary Progression of Interpretive Methods
The Court has relied on traditional techniques in interpreting Korematsu.
Under stare decisis, Korematsu has been held to be on point or distinguishable. The
Court has also used Korematsu in ways not explainable by traditional stare decisis. It
has been interpreted to be relevant to cases raising legal issues far removed from
those decided in Korematsu. Alternatively, the Court sometimes has consciously not
cited Korematsu when giving citations for propositions for which Korematsu is di-
rectly on point. Finally, the Court has interpreted its applicability in light of Kore-
matsu's historical significance.
a. Stare Decisis
The Korematsu case has been applied in a traditional manner under stare decisis,
primarily from the 1940s through the 1960s, in cases involving postwar regula-
tion, 114 immigration law,'0 5 and national security law. 10 6 Stare decisis typically re-
quires analysis based on analogy: the Court compares the holding and the associated
100. See generally Takahata, supra note 47 (advancing argument that under current legal doctrines, Kore-
marsu would be decided differently); see also PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 239 ("the law has
evolved in the last forty years ..."). Former Justice Goldberg claimed that Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), overruled Korematsu on the equal protection issue. See IRONS, supra note 9, at 13. Actually, the
Court in Boiling cited Korematsu as support for the standard of strict scrutiny. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
101. The report, Personal Justice Denied, argued that in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946),
the Court struck down the imposition of martial law in Hawaii and thus showed no deference to military
authorities. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 238-39; see also Takahata, supra note 47, at 137-
38 (also relying on Duncan). The Court relied, however, on statutory interpretation, rather than on constitu-
tional grounds. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 313-18.
102. In Personal Justice Denied, the commission indicated that the reason that Korematsu has not been
overruled is because "we have not been so unfortunate that a repetition of the facts has occurred to give the
Court that opportunity . PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 239; see also IRONS, supra note
22, at 366.
103. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
104. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 767 n.9 (1948) (citing Korematsu to support the view
that post-war recovery of excess profits on war contracts was constitutional given comparable "federal regula-
tion of civilian liberty and property in proportion to the increasing demands of modern warfare").
105. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (holding that denial of passports for travel to Cuba
was not a denial of due process and citing Korematsu for support that due process requirements are a function
of the extent of the necessity for the restriction); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 106 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[WIhere Congress has determined that considerations of the highest national importance indi-
cate a cause of action for which an adequate substitute is lacking, I cannot say that this means [expatriation]
lies beyond Congress' power to choose."); Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (Frank-
furter, J.,dissenting) (citing Korematsu to support assertion that due process renders what may be due to a
"strong state as well as to a free individual"). Immigration cases also raise national security issues. See infra
notes 196, 199.
106. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 661 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring)
(distinguishing Korematsu because Congress expressly authorized the presidential actions).
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facts of a case previously decided with the legal issues and facts in a case at issue. 1° 7
If the pertinent legal issues are sufficiently analogous, the Court may follow the prior
case and cite it for support. Alternatively, if the prior case bears some analogy, but is
not sufficiently on point to be determinative-or perhaps there is a more analogous
case already decided-the Court may distinguish it.
Korematsu has been cited as being on point- and thus supportive of an outcome
reached as well as being distinguishable and of no persuasive value. A typical exam-
ple of the former is Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,l °8 decided in 1952 at the beginning of
the Cold War. The Court upheld a statute authorizing the deportation of a resident
alien based on a past history of membership in the Communist Party.10 9 The Hari-
siades Court cited Korematsu for two principles. First, the Court observed that fed-
eral policy governing aliens was "vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government."' 1 ° The Court
concluded that because these policies were "so exclusively entrusted to the political
branches of government," 1 ' they were "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference."' 12 The Court cited Korematsu in a footnote to show the extent of the
"war power over even citizens."" 3 The Court cited Korematsu a second time when it
observed that Communist aggression was creating "hardships for loyal citizens"114
and thus "it is hard to find justification for holding that the Constitution requires
that its hardships must be spared the Communist alien."1 15 The Court then turned
to the example of the government's exclusion of Japanese citizens from their homes
and businesses and cited Korematsu." 6 Thus, Korematsu provided direct support for
the use of immigration policy to support the exclusion of a resident alien.
The Court's reliance on Korematsu in Harisiades shows the potentially large
influence Korematsu might have on constitutional law. It could be used to justify
sweeping measures by the government over aliens and citizens alike by way of a
fortiori logic. As shown in Harisiades, if the government can show that its activities
are connected to its sovereign powers, Korematsu could be construed to justify meas-
ures at least equivalent to excluding citizens from their homes without providing due
process.
Alternatively, the Court has found it necessary to distinguish Korematsu. For
example, in Kent v. Dulles,1 17 decided in 1958, for example, the Court interpreted a
federal statute not to authorize the Secretary of State to deny passports to citizens
because of their alleged ties to the Communist Party.' The Court found that a
citizen's right to travel was a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
107. See SusAN W. BRENNER, PRECEDENT INFLATION 17 n.2 4 (1992). Despite the central nature of the
practice of stare decisis, it has been said that "our theoretical understanding of the practice is still at a very
primitive stage" and "if one were to ask law students, lawyers, judges, or legal academics what following
precedent entails, one would almost surely get a variety of inconsistent answers." Larry Alexander, Con-
strained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
108. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
109. See id. at 591-92, 598.
110. Id. at 588-89.
111. Id. at 589.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 589 n.16.
114. Id. at 591.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
118. See id. at 117-18, 130.
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Fifth Amendment. To avoid finding the statute unconstitutional, the Court inter-
preted narrowly the section of the statute that assigned broad discretion to the Secre-
tary of State to issue passports.1 1 9 The Court recognized that Korematsu allowed the
government to exclude citizens from their homes and to "restrict their freedom of
movement."12 ° The Court distinguished Kent from Korematsu in three ways: (1)
Congress was not acting jointly with the President; (2) the country was not at war;
and (3) there was no imminent danger. These were the kinds of the factors included
by Justice Black in the majority opinion.
To the extent that there is a consensus that Korematsu was wrongly decided,
using stare decisis to distinguish Kent is an effective way to confine it. This technique
fleshes out the essential features of Korematsu and limits its applicability through
definition. Thus, the diffuse and unqualified quality of the holding in Korematsu
might be clarified, defined, and limited through stare decisis. For example, Justice
Frankfurter believed that Korematsu could be confined to the context of the exercise
of the war power.121 Later courts could accomplish this by continually distinguish-
ing it as precedent. Moreover, this technique could result in the eventual overruling
"sub silentio" of Korematsu.122 There is indeed a natural resistance to overruling
cases, with courts preferring to accomplish the equivalent result by distinguishing
and qualifying the precedent out of existence.123 The traditional use of stare decisis
with respect to Korematsu appears, however, to have been abandoned by the mid-
1960s. After this period, the Court used interpretive methods different than those
usually associated with stare decisis.
b. Hyperbole
From the mid-1950s to the present day, both a majority and individual Justices
have cited Korematsu most frequently for the principle that racial classifications by
the government are subject to strict scrutiny. 24 The leading example remains Lov-
ing v. Virginia,"' in which the Court held that a Virginia criminal statute proscrib-
ing interracial marriages violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 6 The State contended that the statute equally punished the white
119. See id. at 127.
120. Id. at 128.
121. See infra note 341.
122. I place quotation marks around sub silentio because the Court's acts of distinguishing this precedent
are explicit. It is silent only in the sense that a case may not be explicitly overruled.
123. See Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 100 (Laurence Goldstein
ed., 1987).
124. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507, 523 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring; Stewart, J., dissenting); Mo-
bile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 550 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 n.10 (1976); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351, 358 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks Lodge Number 2043 v. Ingraham, 411 U.S. 924, 928 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 668 (1966); McLauglin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954); see also Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitu-
tion, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571, 583 (1995) [hereinafter Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution].
125. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. See id. at 12.
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and non-white participants in the marriage and thus, although it employed racial
classifications, it did not invidiously discriminate. 1 27 The Court disagreed, holding
that because the statute established racial classifications, "[t]he mere fact of equal
application"'1 28 did not excuse it from the "Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations." 129 The Court stated that "racial classifications,
especially suspect in criminal statutes, should be subjected to the 'most rigid scru-
tiny."'13 ° The Court then cited Korematsu in support of this claim.'3 1
This interpretation of Korematsu is usefully characterized as an example of "hy-
perbole." The interpretation was not based on any legal principle used in Korematsu.
Certainly, the Court in Loving and other equal protection cases that cite Korematsu
for this purpose accurately quote language found in that case. But the Court clearly
did not impose heightened scrutiny of the government's objectives in Korematsu.
Thus, the words "especially suspect" and "most rigid scrutiny" do not describe a
legal principle actually used in that case. Instead, the logic used when the Korematsu
Court actually conducted its analysis of the government's avowed objectives indi-
cated near-total deference to the government. 132 Because the Court's holding in
Korematsu was consistent with virtually complete deference to the government's con-
clusion, the more appropriate citation to Korematsu should be but see rather than
see. 1
33
Moreover, the Court did not even conduct an equal protection clause analysis
in Korematsu. The Court devoted its opinion wholly to the issue of whether the
government's actions were within the war powers of Congress and the President; it
did not address equal protection doctrine. However, even if the Court had done so,
Korematsu would not belong to the modern jurisprudence of the equal protection
clause because it was decided prior to Brown v. Board of Education.134  The Court
did not impose a strict scrutiny analysis prior to Brown, relying instead on a rational
basis test. 135 Moreover, the Court did not impose the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause on the federal government until 1954, when it decided Bolling v.
Sharpe.1 36 Prior to that time, the Court was limited to relying upon a Due Process
Clause analysis because the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not contain an equal protection clause. 137 The Court in Hirabayashi con-
cluded that the Fifth Amendment "restrains only such discriminatory legislation by
127. See id. at 8.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 11.
131. See id.
132. See infra note 320.
133. See HARVARD LAw REvIEw ASSOCIATION, BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYsTEM OF CITATION 24
(16th ed. 1996).
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213,
232-33 (1991). For other historical accounts about the development of equal protection doctrine, see Paul
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976); Michael W.
Dowdle, The Descent ofAntidiscrimination: On the Intellectual Origins of the Current Equal Protection Jurispru-
dence, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1991); Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court
1873-1903, at 29 BUFF. L. REv. 667 (1980).
136. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Arthur Goldberg, a former Justice, contended that Bolling overruled Kore-
matsu. See infra text accompanying notes 228-29. However, the Court in Bolling cited Korematsu for sup-
port. In so doing, it appears more plausible that the Court in Bolling was reaffirming the exception created
by Korematsu, rather than overruling it.
137. See Dowdle, supra note 135, at 1224 n.385.
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Congress as amounts to a denial of due process." 1 38 The Court's citation of Kore-
matsu in Loving is a rather extravagant reading of the case. It ignores the context for
the language it cites as well as where the case fits with respect to constitutional
jurisprudence.
The Court also resorted to hyperbole in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
139
in which the majority explicitly stated its reliance on Korematsu for overruling recent
precedent, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.14 In Metro Broadcasting, the Court had
applied an intermediate scrutiny standard to determine the legitimacy of federal
affirmative action programs. In Adarand, however, the Court claimed that strict
scrutiny was the more appropriate standard and stated that Korematsu taught that
"even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial
classification."141 The Court assumed in Adarand that it had applied a strict scru-
tiny standard in Korematsu, but that it had still been unable to detect the underlying
racist motivation.14 In Adarand, the Court concluded that, in light of what hap-
pened in Korematsu, imposing an intermediate standard of review on affirmative
action programs might not be a stringent enough test. It held that strict scrutiny
should be applied to federal affirmative action programs because the Court may
otherwise lack the capability to distinguish between invidious discrimination and
benign promotion of racial diversity. 14 3 Those who contend that Korematsu is over-
ruled or irrelevant ignore this continuing usage.
c. Present Absence
In the past decade, the language of the Court's narrative and the surrounding
circumstances in several cases have created the clear impression that the Court is
relying on Korematsu, but refusing to cite the case. 144 Korematsu takes on a "present
absence" in such cases. In Reno v. Flores,145 for example, the Court held that due
process was not violated by a rule presuming that detention was more appropriate
than release for juvenile aliens who could only be released to their parents, close
relatives, or legal guardians, except in unusual and compelling circumstances.16
The Court's strongest precedent in support of justifying detention without an indi-
vidual showing of risk to the community was Korematsu, although the Court failed
to cite it for support. The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens cited a string of
nine prior cases in which the Court had indicated that due process normally requires
that the government "demonstrate, on an individual basis, that detention in fact
serves th[e] interest [of protecting a juvenile's welfare]."' 47 Following this string of
citations, Justice Stevens offered a footnote that observed that there is "one notable
exception to this long line of cases: Korematsu v. United States" 4 8 and further noted
138. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.
139. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
140. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
141. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citation omitted).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (permitting the President to order inter-
ception of vessels from Haiti without first determining whether the passengers were qualified as refugees);
Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (rejecting challenge to immigration policy of detaining juveniles
suspected of being subject to deportation); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
145. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
146. See id. at 303.
147. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 344 n.30.
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that "[t]he Court today does not cite that case, but the Court's holding in Korematsu
obviously supports the majority's analysis."' 49 Justice Stevens then stated that he
understood "the majority's reluctance to rely on Korematsu"15' because it had in-
volved a wartime emergency and recently had been publicly recognized as a mistake
by Congress in the course of authorizing reparations. 15 1 The majority failed to re-
spond to this criticism.
Another similar example is United States v. Salerno,'52 in which the Court up-
held federal legislation authorizing pretrial detention on the basis of future dan-
ger.' 5 3 In reversing the federal court of appeals, the Court quoted this lower court
as concluding that "'the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the
ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the
duration of the detention."" In arriving at this conclusion, the federal court of
appeals had found it necessary to distinguish Korematsu based on the nature of the
criminal activity. 155 The Supreme Court held, however, that the governmental in-
terest in public safety can outweigh an individual's liberty interest.' 56  It stated
rather pointedly: "For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's inter-
est is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the government
believes to be dangerous."' 157 The Court did not cite Korematsu. In so doing, it
ignored citations to Korematsu, either for support by the Justice Department' 5 8 or to
distinguish it in the briefs of the defendant-respondent 159 and by various amici
groups.' 60 Thus, the Court reached a position consistent with Korematsu and cited
wartime exigencies as a supportive example of the need for occasional curtailment of
the liberties of individuals. Yet the majority did not cite Korematsu despite discus-
sion in the briefs and by the federal appellate court below. The technique of present
absence thus avoided acknowledging the logically relevant application of the case.
d. Historical
Beginning in the 1980s, the Court and individual Justices have used Korematsu
as a history lesson.16 1 Under traditional notions of stare decisis, unless the Court has
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
153. See id. at 755.
154. Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1986).
155. See United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d at 74.
156. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
157. Id. at 748.
158. See Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Salerno, 381 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87),
reprinted in 171 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 39, 63; Reply Brief for the United States at 9, United
States v. Salerno, 381 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87), reprinted in 171 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at
147, 159.
159. See Brief for Salerno at 27, 33 n.25, United States v. Salerno, 381 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87),
reprinted in 171 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 89, 123, 129 n.25.
160. Amicus Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 24 n.5, United States v. Salerno, 381
U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87), reprinted in 171 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 191, 224 n.5; Amicus
Brief of Howard Perry at 33, United States v. Salerno, 381 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87), reprinted in 171
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 314, 366; Amicus Brief of the Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia at 7, United States v. Salerno, 381 U.S. 739 (1987) (No. 86-87), reprinted in 171 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 376, 389.
16 1. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. at 2136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Metro Broad-
casting v. FCC, 497 U.S. at 603, 633 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1988) (Murphy, J.,
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overruled a case, it is either cited as positive support for a proposition or distin-
guished and found to be of no support. The Court has not overruled Korematsu and
yet, through historical interpretation, Justices assign negative persuasive weight to the
result reached in Korematsu. This approach recognizes that Korematsu is now pub-
licly perceived to have been decided incorrectly. By placing Korematsu in its histori-
cal context, the Court therefore is able to use it in a way substantially different from
ordinary stare decisis.
The most important use of this historical approach occurs in affirmative action
cases. Affirmative action programs remain an important exception to the general
prohibition against racial classifications imposed by the government. They share
significant similarities to the facts provided by the Court in Korematsu: an important
governmental objective, a temporary imposition, and a limited means of accom-
plishing the government objective. Conservative and liberal Justices therefore have
been engaged in an ongoing debate over the historical meaning of Korematsu in light
of these similarities. In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 16 2 for example, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a city's affirmative action program that
awarded construction contracts to general contractors who gave to minority-owned
businesses at least thirty percent of the contract's total dollar amount. The Court
imposed strict scrutiny-not citing Korematsu for this point-and found that the
city failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to justify the affirma-
tive action plan. The majority further found that the means were not narrowly
tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Justice O'Connor stated, on
behalf of the Court, that a generalized assertion that there has been past discrimina-
tion in the entire construction industry could not justify the use of an unyielding
quota.63 She also stated that when the government "chooses to employ a suspect
classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the classification's
relevance to its goals"' 6 4 and that race should not be rendered "a legitimate proxy for
a particular condition merely by declaring that the condition exists."16 5 Justice
O'Connor concluded by citing Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Korematsu:
"The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial defer-
ence to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal
protection jurisprudence." 166
The Court's historical use of Korematsu in Croson is different from the distor-
tion of its holding when relying on hyperbole. However, it uses the case in a way
consistent with the conventional wisdom that it was wrongly decided. We may
disagree among ourselves whether the logical meaning provided by the Court was
correct but at least the majority in Croson provided an explanation for its use of
Korematsu. The Court interpreted Korematsu as providing a lesson, based on history,
that absolute discretion should not be accorded to governmental authorities in rely-
ing on racial classifications. The Court's exercise of historical interpretation defines
Korematsu in the modern day.
However, the Court's use of Korematsu to strike down affirmative action pro-
grams may be quite ironic. Although the City of Richmond's affirmative action
dissenting); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 357 (1987) (Brennan, J.; dissenting); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 522 (1986).
162. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
163. See id. at 498-99.
164. Id. at 500.
165. Id. at 500-01.
166. Id. at 501.
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program benefited minorities (including "Oriental" persons 6 7), the Court held that
Korematsu supported its holding that such a program was unconstitutional. In vig-
orous dissent, Justice Marshall argued that there should be an important distinction
between invidious racial classifications and those that remedy past discrimination. 68
This view implied that Korematsu was distinguishable because it involved invidious
racial discrimination. This debate over the legitimacy of an affirmative action pro-
gram also illustrates the crux of the modern struggle over what meaning should be
attributed to Korematsu.
In summary, the Court's interpretation of Korematsu, which began with tradi-
tional reliance on stare decisis, has evolved to dependence on other interpretive meth-
ods. The techniques of hyperbole and present absence allow the Court to match its
use of Korematsu to a modern public view that recognizes the injustice of the Japa-
nese internment. Historical interpretation also allows the Court to use Korematsu
consistently with this new public perception and does not depend on gross distor-
tion of its original meaning.
D. The Relationship Between Narrative and Interpretation
The Court's reliance on evolving interpretive methodologies has mirrored
changing public sentiments about the Japanese internment. This observation may
be demonstrated by examining a decisionmaking model that describes the interplay
between the Court's choices of (1) when to cite Korematsu explicitly, and (2) what
legal meaning to attribute to Korematsu. This model treats Korematsu as a judicial
narrative and determines whether the Court uses it in a logical or rhetorical manner.
By "logic," I am referring to analytic reasoning informing interpretation. This kind
of logical interpretation may take the form of theory, systematic explanation, exam-
ple, or empiricism. Such logic should connect the Korematsu case with the interpre-
tation and thereby help to define it. Alternatively, the Court could make either of
the two determinations based on the persuasive imagery of the Korematsu case. By
"persuasive," I mean that the Court bases its determination on using the imagery
connected to Korematsu to convince and influence the audience who reads its opin-
ions. Logical analysis and persuasive imagery usually go hand-in-hand: strong logic
appeals to our sense of rightness and fairness. This linkage is, however, not necessar-
ily required. If the Court relies on the logic found within Korematsu to support its
legal interpretation, the reader may find this support unpersuasive because of the
negative connotations of the Korematsu case. Alternatively, a Court's citation to
Korematsu may represent reliance on a powerful symbol that defies logical analysis.
When the Court cites Korematsu for the principle of strict scrutiny, it relies on Kore-
matsu for purely persuasive reasons since the case cannot be logically interpreted in
this way. In this circumstance, Korematsu may not be relevant to the particular legal
interpretation made by the Court, but the Court offers a distorted interpretation of
Korematsu for rhetorical effect.
The Court tends to make determinations about citing to Korematsu and giving
it meaning based primarily on its persuasive effect. The Court relies on certain
forms of interpretation, such as hyperbole and present absence. Also, its interpreta-
tion of Korematsu tends to reflect the public's changing perception of the Japanese
internment. Moreover, the Court's silent unwillingness to overrule or explicitly de-
167. Id. at 506.
168. See id. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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fine what Korematsu means today perpetuates Korematsu's vitality as precedent in
equal protection jurisprudence, criminal law, national security law, and immigration
law.
1. Korematsu as an Evolving Public Narrative
The Court's use of Korematsu appears to have evolved in ways that reflect
changing public attitudes toward civil rights generally and the Japanese internment
in particular. In the post-World War II period, the Court routinely cited Korematsu
in cases involving economic regulation, immigration law, and national security law.
Thus, the Court used Korematsu consistently with traditional notions of stare decisis.
The Court's selection of Korematsu for citation as precedent can be analyzed as a
two-step decisionmaking process.' 69 The first-order determination selects a case
from the universe of possible precedents to be included. This decision is usually
implicit as the Court has never developed strict criteria as to which precedent must
be discussed in the course of its analysis. The Court's second-order determination
establishes the meaning of the case with respect to the opinion citing it; it may be
used as supportive precedent or it may be distinguished. In the traditional use of
precedent described above, the Court in the post-war period relied on both the
logical relevance and persuasiveness of the precedent at both orders of determina-
tion. This may have reflected the fact that Korematsu's logic and persuasiveness were
widely perceived as harmonious. While academic criticism and some public sympa-
thy for the former internees existed, the general public still harbored substantial
racial prejudice toward those of Japanese ancestry. 170 The Court's reliance on Kore-
matsu through stare decisis coincided with this public perception that the Japanese
internment was justified.
In the 1950s, the Court's interpretation of Korematsu began moving away
from this traditional approach. At that time, the Court initiated interpretation of
the case in a hyperbolic way and cited it as support for strict scrutiny of racial
classifications made by the government that burden minorities. By the 1960s, the
traditional use of stare decisis as a technique of interpretation had waned, and the
Court used Korematsu most frequently as hyperbole. This usage coincided, of
course, with the post-Brown Civil Rights Era when the Warren Court expanded the
scope of protections contained within the Bill of Rights. The hyperbolic interpreta-
tion of Korematsu created a comforting myth that the Court had tried its hardest by
imposing its strictest scrutiny when it validated the racial classifications in the in-
ternment cases. Reliance on hyperbole served as a means of justifying the recent past
and yet urged caution in the future. The Court's use of Korematsu as hyperbole
reflected a decision at both the first- and second-order determinations to use the
precedent in a persuasive, rather than logical, manner. In the first-order determina-
tion, the Court selected Korematsu for inclusion in its equal protection cases despite
the fact that it did not address equal protection doctrine. In the second-order deter-
mination, the Court misinterpreted Korematsu as being about the application of
strict scrutiny.
169. For discussions about the role of precedent in constitutional law, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 11 HAv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988).
170. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 241-43.
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The Court's recent reliance on the techniques of present absence and historical
interpretation reflects yet another change-increased politicial activism of Asian
Americans-in the 1980s. Persona/Justice Denied provided a ringing public declara-
tion that the Japanese internment was unjustified and included a call for reparations.
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988171 constituted firm acknowledgment of the injustice
backed by a commitment to make monetary reparations for those who were in-
terned. In the context of these public narratives, a Court's citation to Korematsu as
affirmative support for its opinion might be logically correct but not persuasive.
The Court thus began to omit reference to the case, even when Korematsu was
highly relevant to its decision. A present absence represents an interactional relation-
ship between the first- and second-order determinations. The first-order determina-
tion to omit reliance on Korematsu may have resulted from the potential dissonance
created if it were cited by the Court. From a logical perspective, consistency with
Korematsu may suggest that a later decision is wrong. From a rhetorical perspective,
the inclusion of Korematsu as support may diminish the persuasiveness of any opin-
ion. Thus, it is conceivable that the dissonance created by facing a second-order
determination led the Court to make a first-order determination to omit Korematsu
despite strong logical relevance.
Finally, the Court's use of Korematsu from an historical perspective allows the
Court to refer explicitly to it for support and yet to be consistent with the conven-
tional wisdom that it resulted in tragedy. The historical interpretation allows logic
and rhetoric to function hand-in-hand because the technique does not need to dis-
tort the holding of Korematsu compared to interpretation based on hyperbole. His-
torical interpretation maintains a logical connection with Korematsu's holding that is
consistent with a traditional use of stare decisis. It also avoids separating the deci-
sion's logic from its rhetoric, unlike the techniques of hyperbole and present
absence.
2. The Consistency of Korematsu with Current Doctrine
The Court's abandonment of stare decisis and its reliance on the techniques of
hyperbole and present absence suggest that Korematsu continues to influence con-
temporary doctrine. If the Court desired to render Korematsu insignificant without
overruling it, the Justices would have relied on stare decisis to narrow the holding
continually to the point of making it sui generis. Instead, the Court's resort to hy-
perbole and present absence suggests an active attempt to nourish Korematsu as
precedent.
When the Court cites Korematsu approvingly as an example of the application
of strict scrutiny, it implicitly takes the position-unless otherwise explicitly
stated-that the Court correctly discerned an exception. Although the relitigation
of Korematsu was successful in showing that the factual basis for the justification of
military necessity was deeply flawed, it could not overturn the legal rule upholding
the military order. 172 Any standard of review, even strict scrutiny, is essentially de-
171. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (1988).
172. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1418-19. Fred Korematsu was not required to prove in the relitiga-
tion that the factual mistake would have made a difference in the original result. Judge Patel ruled that the
Justice Department's failure to alert the Court about the conflicting information it held regarding the danger
of espionage and sabotage was enough to justify vacating Korematsu's criminal sentence. See id. Because the
Court appeared to rely on a standard of review that was highly deferential, it seems unlikely that even if the
Justice Department informed the Court of additional information conflicting with its assessment of risk of
espionage, there would have been a different outcome.
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fined by its application. Thus, the Court appears to recognize that Korematsu is a
valid instance in which the Court correctly imposed strict scrutiny and yet found the
government's justifications acceptable. The Court's failure to define the standard of
review in Korematsu means that there is an unknown quantum of flexibility within
the strict scrutiny test. Reliance on hyperbole as an interpretive technique is there-
fore not without potentially damaging doctrinal consequences.
The Court's reliance on the technique of present absence has a similar effect.
By not citing Korematsu, the Court avoids the possibility of having to distinguish or
dismiss its importance explicitly, even if Korematsu was indeed not applicable. Alter-
natively, this technique allows the Court to expand on legal principles contained in
Korematsu without having to defend its reliance on this precedent.
The Court's reliance on hyperbole and present absence results, ironically, in the
expansion of doctrine consistent with Korematsu. The continued expansion of re-
lated doctrine may indicate the need to keep Korematsu as binding as precedent.
Overruling Korematsu would cast doubt on the substantive wisdom of its continued
existence or expansion. Through hyperbole, the Court preserves some undefined
discretion in its application of strict scrutiny. Through present absence, the Court
can expand the role of judicial deference, as in Salerno' 7 3 and Reno, 174 without ac-
knowledging that they are among the progeny of Korematsu.
3. The Failure to Overrule Korematsu
Korematsu's continued vibrancy should not be blamed on the Court's lack of
opportunity to diminish or overrule it. The Court has had repeated opportunities to
do so, but has instead cited to Korematsu for support. In Bolling v. Sharpe,1 75 the
Court could have overruled Korematsu when, consistent with Brown, it imposed the
strict scrutiny requirement on the federal government through the Fifth Amend-
ment. 176 However, instead of properly acknowledging Korematsu as an instance in
which the Court was highly deferential to the government's justifications, the Bolling
Court cited Korematsu to support the imposition of the strict scrutiny standard.
177
The Court thus legitimized Korematsu as an undefined example of the proper appli-
cation of strict scrutiny despite its burdensome effect on a minority. Any standard
of review is most importantly defined by its application. Thus, the Court's approval
of the standard of review in Korematsu-despite whatever terminology it assigns to
that standard-amounts to an acknowledgment that there is a significant area of
discretion in allowing approval of certain racial classifications.
17 8
Most recently, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,'7 9 the Court again made a
major revision in equal protection doctrine by declaring that strict scrutiny should
be imposed on all racial classifications imposed by the federal government, including
affirmative action programs. 80 In Adarand, the Court invalidated a federal regula-
173. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
175. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
176. See id. at 499.
177. See id. at 499 n.3.
178. Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court expanded the types of racial classifica-
tions to include certain race-conscious approaches purporting to treat separate classes equally, which are
subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection jurisprudence. But, again, the Court cited Korematsu for
support, rather than declaring it obsolete. See id. at 11.
179. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
180. See id. at 2117.
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tion that gave to prime contractors bidding on government contracts for a highway
construction project an advantage if they hired subcontractors owned by minority
businesses. 8 ' The Court had applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal affirmative
action in a recent decision,' 82 thus creating a less stringent level of review than had
previously been applied to affirmative action programs sponsored by states.' 8 3 The
Court had an opportunity to overrule Korematsu or to render it insignificant by
acknowledging that it applied an obsolete standard of review.
Instead the Court predictably relied on Korematsu to overrule the intermediate
scrutiny standard.' 8 4 The Court furthermore emphasized that the new strict scru-
tiny standard that it was requiring was not "fatal in fact,"' 8 5 further implying that it
was creating a much more flexible standard of review. The Court then approvingly
cited Korematsu for support of its strict scrutiny standard.'8 6 While it is difficult to
believe that Korematsu should serve as a role model for defining the limits of strict
scrutiny, the Court's reliance on hyperbole creates the potential for misunderstand-
ing Korematsu's continued role in equal protection law.
II. THE NARRATIVES FOUND WITHIN KORr'MATSU
The modern Court's difficulty in properly interpreting Korematsu had its gene-
sis in a deception contained within the original opinion. The Court in Korematsu
failed to provide a logical explanation for reaching its result and instead deceptively
relied on persuasive rhetoric. The majority in Korematsu ignored narratives provided
by the parties most intimately involved: Korematsu and DeWitt. The Court instead
relied on narratives that could not provide a logical basis for its decision.
Part II describes how the Court integrated and attributed meanings to the nar-
ratives contained within Korematsu. The disjointed quality of the written opinion
resulted from the Court's propensity to choose narratives and assign them meaning
based on their persuasive appeal rather than their logical relevance to Korematsu's
interpretation. This practice led to the failure to establish an interpretive-narrative
link-a meaningful connection between the narrative and the Court's rule of law.
The Court's failure to establish this link was the cause for the disharmony among
the messages within the opinion about the standard of review imposed. Later courts
181. See id. at 2101-02.
182. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
183. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
184. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (noting reliance on Korematsu and Hirabayashi among other cases).
The Court repeatedly noted that Korematsu purported to apply strict scrutiny, but concluded that "Korematsu
demonstrates vividly that even 'the most rigid scrutiny' can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial
classification." Id. at 2117. The Court thus implied that Korematsu correctly applied the strict scrutiny
standard, but still failed to find the government's justification faulty.
In dissent, Justice Stevens also noted the Court's reliance on Korematsu. See id. at 2125 n.8 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent, however, that the Court's analysis "strongly suggests" that
strict scrutiny should be fatal to racial classifications that burden minorites. See id. at 2136 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting). The majority opinion is silent on that point, probably because this conclusion is at odds with its
logic. The majority points out that it does not feel that it can reliably distinguish between benign versus
invidious discrimination. See id. at 2112. Furthermore, the majority made clear that the strict scrutiny
doctrine was not "fatal in fact." Id. at 2117. Finally, by citing Korematsu as aflirmative support, it implied
that it correctly applied the standard, but nevertheless was unable to find the government's justification
unsatisfactory. See id. at 2117.
185. Id. at 2117.
186. The Court noted the inexplicable result reached in Korematsu in light of the apparent application of
strict scrutiny. See id. at 2106-07. However, the Court stated that the correct standard was applied, yet the
wrong resulf was reached. See id. at 2116.
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misinterpret Korematsu because of the way that the Korematsu Court wrote its opin-
ion. Justice Black, writing for the majority in Korematsu, explicitly claimed that he
wrote a narrow and unimportant opinion to avoid the "momentous questions not
contained within the framework of the pleadings or the evidence in this case." 187 By
making rhetorical appeals that did not articulate the legal basis for the decision,
however, he created an opinion that was easily misinterpreted.
A. A Narrative-Based Approach to Interpreting Korematsu
I offer an interpretation of Korematsu based on a narrative approach. This
method considers the various narratives available to the Court and the reasons for
the Court's decision to incorporate some, but not all, of the possibilities. Further-
more, this approach attempts to discern the meaning assigned to the narratives
placed within judicial opinions. A narrative-based approach to interpreting a judi-
cial opinion is especially useful in a case such as Korematsu because it appears to be a
combination of discrete narratives. By tracing the origins of these discrete narratives,
it may become possible to understand better what the writer of the majority opinion
(Justice Black) was trying to express. This helps to determine whether the Court
uses narratives merely in a rhetorical fashion or whether it connects its narratives to
its interpretation by indicating the narrative's logical relevance.
1. The Court's Non-Reliance on the Narratives of Parties Personally Involved
The Court opinion scarcely refers to the narratives of the two parties personally
involved in the Japanese internment itself. the petitioner, Fred Korematsu, and the
military commander who ordered the Japanese internment, General John DeWitt.
Below I consider why the Court chose not to describe these narratives.
a. Fred Korematsu's Narrative
When deciding how to write the Korematsu opinion, Justice Black appears to
have concluded that the most persuasive approach was to minimize references to
Korematsu and his personal story, which were well-documented in the briefs for the
petitioner and the government. The identity of Korematsu could be construed as
irrelevant from a doctrinal perspective. In order to satisfy legal requirements, Justice
Black's task was to justify deference to the military's judgment for exclusion en
masse rather than to show how the exclusion was justifiable with respect to Kore-
matsu as an individual. Still, the near-total lack of description about "the peti-
tioner," including the failure even to state his name, is striking. As a matter of
ritual, the prefatory portion of judicial opinions contains a recital of the facts to
provide a background and to give some explanation and context.188 Furthermore, it
is not uncommon for a judicial opinion to offer some facts, even if irrelevant, be-
cause of their persuasive effect. Perhaps the non-inclusion of background facts in
Korematsu was a result of a decision that it was the most persuasive way to present
the Court's opinion. Although the foreign-sounding name of the petitioner, Fred
Toyosaburo Korematsu, may cause some readers to alienate him based on nationalis-
tic and racial attitudes, the Court probably felt that it was more persuasive to keep
the petitioner without identity. By leaving the petitioner unidentified, the Court
187. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
188. Thus, a key development of a first-year law student's skill is to decide which facts in the preface of
an opinion are relevant when the all-too-familiar question by a professor asks for a restatement of the impor-
tant facts of a case.
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made him a stranger to all readers and rendered him a more universal object of
suspicion without overtly appealing to prejudice.189
The opinion for the Court also failed to relate much about Korematsu's per-
sonal narrative.' 90 The petitioner's brief contained four pages illuminating who
Korematsu was and why he had failed to report to an assembly center as ordered.' 9'
Even the government's brief provided a synopsis of facts that acknowledged the
identity and loyalty of Korematsu.' 9 2 "The petitioner" was not simply an American
citizen of Japanese descent whose loyalty had not been questioned; 1 93 Fred Kore-
matsu was a native-born citizen who had spent the entire twenty-five years of his life
in the United States. Nor was he a passive observer of the war whose loyalties were
not discernible; he had actually chosen to aid the war by fighting for his country.
Korematsu had tried to enlist in the military, but had been informed by his physi-
cian that he was not fit to serve because of stomach ulcers. When he reported for
the draft, the military rejected him because of this medical impairment. 1 94
Fired by his employer at the outset of the war because he was of Japanese
ancestry, Korematsu desperately wanted to join and be part of the white community.
Korematsu refused to leave the designated area because he wanted to stay with his
white girlfriend; 195 he underwent surgery to alter his slanted eyes;1 96 he changed his
name to Clyde Sarah; and he altered his draft card to fit this identity. 197 The
Court's opinion, of course, would have been less persuasive if it had included Kore-
matsu's narrative. If the narrative were seen as idiosyncratic, it also emphasized the
individuality of Japanese Americans, thereby raising questions about General De-
Witt's treatment of persons of Japanese ancestry anchored in his claim that "a Jap is
a Jap.' 198 On the other hand, if Korematsu were seen as a typical citizen, this would
highlight the obvious fact that a large group, who presented little or no national
security risk, was being made to endure the anti-Japanese fervor on the West Coast.
After reviewing Fred Korematsu's narrative, Justice Black probably understood
that it was also potentially inflammatory. If the Court's opinion contained a de-
tailed presentation of Korematsu's narrative, it would invite sympathy or rejection
based on what the reader's attitude was toward explicit manifestations of racism.
The danger confronting the Court was that if it painted a detailed picture overly
disparaging of Korematsu and his plight, it would appear that the Court itself har-
189. In Latin and other ancient languages, a single word designated strangers and enemies. See Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigaration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 n.2 (1984) (citing MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 32 (1983)).
190. Contrast Justice Black's non-description of Korematsu with his detailed description of an immigrant
alien whom he argued should not have been excluded from the United States in his dissent in Shaughnessy v.
United States, 345 U.S. 206, 216-217 (1953).
191. See Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted
in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 101-05.
192. See Brief for the United States at 4-5, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22),
reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 197, 206-07.
193. See id. at 206.
194. Brief for Appellant at 4, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 102.
195. See id.
196. See id.; see also Aviam Soifer, Lawyers and Loyalty, 1984 REv. AM. HIs'r. 575, 581.
197. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted
in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 3, 26.
198. Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 40 (quoting an unspecified article in
the S.F. NEWS, Apr. 13, 1943).
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bored anti-Japanese sentiment. Justice Black no doubt understood the seriousness of
this danger. Just seven years earlier, the Senate's confirmation of his nomination to
the Supreme Court had been in jeopardy because of his past involvement in Ku Klux
Klan activities. 99 As the writer of the Court's opinion, Justice Black must have
understood that both the Court's legitimacy and his own reputation depended in
large measure on how the opinion justified its result.
When the Court finally identified "the petitioner" as "Korematsu" on the next-
to-last page of its opinion, the majority carefully de-emphasized the importance of
the petitioner's identity and narrative: "Korematsu was not excluded from the Mili-
tary Area because of hostility to him or his race. "200 Instead of providing factual dicta
about the petitioner, the Court provided legal dicta by describing in detail the his-
tory of the military order, the Executive Order, and the Act of Congress, all of which
was unnecessary to decide the case.2 1' By focusing on these institutional responses
to wartime rather than on Korematsu as an individual, the Court's opinion did not
allow the development of reader sympathy or concern for the petitioner. By provid-
ing a detailed narrative about the development of the legal structure, the Court
provided a context for an intellectualized rationale and could ignore the actual trag-
edy suffered by an individual.
b. General John DeWitt's Narrative
The Court also abbreviated its description of narratives by General John De-
Witt and his supporters. In fact, the Court's recitation of these narratives consisted
of merely two sentences and a footnote. The footnote contained references to a
small fraction of the testimony delivered by supporters of the internment in the
hearings before Congress and in General DeWitt's Final Report.2 ° 2  The two
sentences in the text cited the refusal of 5,000 of the 70,000 Japanese American
199. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 22, at 335.
200. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added).
201. See id. at 216-17.
202. See id. at 219 n.2. The Final Report was a massive document of 618 pages with many tables and
diagrams. The document devoted only twelve pages to the justification of the internment. See JOHN L.
DEwrr, FINAL REPORT, JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942, at 7-19 (1942). The
remainder of the report was simply descriptive of the internment process. The only direct evidence presented
on the issue of sabotage and espionage comprised half a page in which the report pointed to the weapons
seized from Japanese families and to concerns about signaling Japanese submarines from coastal areas. See id.
at 8. The weapons described were guns of small caliber and of a type typically owned by farmers. See
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 62, 88. The episodes of suspected signaling were dismissed by
other government agencies of dubious consequence and unrelated to activities by those of Japanese ancestry.
See id. at 63. The report's description of these episodes led to the government's disavowal of reliance on any
specific information in the report other than what the government stated in its own brief. See Brief for the
United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 213. The remainder of the report devoted to the justification for the
internment relied on highly attenuated evidence, including membership in cultural organizations, dual citi-
zenship, the practice by some parents of sending their children to Japan for education, and the attendance by
children of Japanese language schools. See DEWrrr, supra, at 9-17. The Court's unwillingness to discuss
these justifications may have been based on its prejudicial assumptions that caused it to refuse to make this
information relevant. A "mammoth" research effort by the Western Defense Command that began in 1942
after the internment resulted in twelve pages of the report containing justifications for the internment. "The
most notable feature of the WDC project was the extraordinarily large effort it devoted to extracting a
minimum of useful information. There is no indication that it uncovered evidence of criminal activity, much
less espionage or sabotage. The entire project was based on dubious assumptions." PERSONAL JUSTICE DE-
NIED, supra note 4, at 199.
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citizens interned to answer "correctly" the two "loyalty" questions on a questionnaire
administered to those who were already forced into relocation camps.2 °3
Unlike the stark abbreviation of the petitioner's narrative, the minimization of
narratives supporting the Court's position is puzzling from a doctrinal perspective.
Although the Court expressed deference to the military judgment, it had claimed to
find at least a reasonable basis for the military order.2 °4 Yet the Court presented
only a tidbit of information from the congressional hearings and the Final Report.
The absence of a systematic presentation of narratives and other evidence to support
the internment effort has led commentators to conclude that the Court imposed an
extremely weak standard of review. 0 5
Why did the Court not analyze the narratives of General DeWitt and his sup-
porters comprehensively? Professor Eugene Rostow, in his seminal article on the
internment, concluded that not only was there insufficient evidence "to satisfy a
reasonably prudent judge or a reasonably prudent general[, but also that] there was
no evidence whatever by which a court might test the responsibility of General De-
Witt's action." 206  Rostow observed that the military proclamations in the Final
Report contained "conclusions, not evidence," 2 7 which would explain why the
Court disregards DeWitt's narrative in its opinion. Rostow has also said that "Gen-
eral DeWitt's Final Report and his testimony before committees of the Congress
clearly indicate that his motivation was ignorant race prejudice, not facts to support
the hypothesis that there was a greater risk of sabotage among the Japanese than
among residents of German, Italian, or any other ethnic affiliation. '2 8  Perhaps the
best way to convey the substance of General DeWitt's narrative is to consider the
most "authoritative determination of fact"' 209 that was offered by the General:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migra-
tion. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third gener-
ation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship,
have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude other-
wise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial
affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die
for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with
Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese,
barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the
United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes.
It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential ene-
mies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are
organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact
that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication
that such action will be taken. 2 10
Clearly, the problem confronting Justice Black in writing the majority opinion
was how to use the facts located in the record of the case to show that the Court was
reasonable and fair in deciding in favor of the military authorities, despite the ra-
203. See infra note 278.
204. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 21, at 508-09.
206. Id. at 520.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Rostow, supra note 21, at 520-21 (citing DEWrr-r, supra note 202, at 34); see also Perea, Ethnicity
and the Constitution, supra note 124, at 586.
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cially inflammatory nature of their narratives. Justice Black resolved this problem by
using only a benign snippet of the record concerning the questionnaire data.2 '
In fact, in its brief, the Justice Department distanced itself from General De-
Witt's narrative in an explicit, but oblique, way. In the famous footnote two of its
brief, the Justice Department informed the Court that it was relying on the Final
Report in a limited way: "for statistics and other details concerning the actual evacua-
tion and the events that took place subsequent thereto."2" 2 The Justice Department
asked the Court to take judicial notice of only the facts stated in its brief relating to
the "justification for the evacuation." The brief further stated that it relied "upon
the Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts."2 13 We now know
that the wording of this statement resulted from controversy within the Justice De-
partment over information from other governmental authorities. These authorities
questioned the accuracy of the Final Report regarding specific instances that allegedly
may have involved espionage and sabotage by persons of Japanese ancestry. Because
of the cryptic wording of the footnote, however, it was unclear whether the govern-
ment was uncomfortable with the factual accuracy, the inflammatory tone, or both
in DeWitt's narrative. From the vantage point of the Court-assuming that it was
unaware of the actual controversy within the Justice Department-the racially in-
flammatory tone of DeWitt's narrative was the more obvious reason to avoid includ-
ing the narrative.
This footnote became the centerpiece of the relitigation of Korematsu. In ear-
lier drafts of the government's brief, the footnote informed the Court that the recital
of facts justifying the evacuation in the Final Report "is in several respects, particularly
with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship signalling
by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession of the
Department of Justice.'' 2 14 The petitioner argued in the 1984 relitigation that the
omission of the contradictory reports critically affected the outcome of the Supreme
Court's decision in 1944. The district court in 1984 held that although Kore-
matsu's conviction should be set aside because "relevant evidence 21 5 had been with-
held, "[w]hether a fuller, more accurate record would have prompted a different
decision cannot be determined.
2 16
211. The Court's review of the record stood in sharp contrast with the systematic presentation by Justice
Murphy. In his dissenting opinion, he devoted over eight pages with sixteen footnotes to reviewing and
analyzing the record. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting). As discussed above, he
demonstrated the racist attitudes held by General DeWitt and his supporters, and analyzed their conclusions.
The contrast between the comprehensive presentation by Justice Murphy of these facts and the Court's
abbreviated discussion of the record has led commentators to conclude that the Court failed to "scrutinize"
the record adequately. For example, the congressional report, Personal Justice Denied, concluded: "If the
Court had looked hard, it would have found that there was nothing there-no facts particularly within
military competence which could be rationally related to the extraordinary action taken." PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED, supra note 4, at 237. Of course, the Court did in fact closely examine and reflect on the record.
Indeed, it is my hypothesis that Justice Black closely examined the record and determined that the opinion
would be less persuasive if it relied on the facts in the record. Justice Black chose not to rely on the narratives
of General DeWitt and his supporters because they were undeniably racist, not because he did not review the
record closely.
212. Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22),
reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 213.
213. Id.
214. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis in original).
215. Id. at 1419.
216. Id.
1996]
UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL
In a sense, every case before a court demands that a judge choose between and
among the narratives of the opposing parties. A judge's written opinion often ech-
oes the narrative of the party whom he or she deems the winner. In Korematsu,
however, Justice Black chose the government as the winning party and yet wrote an
opinion that carefully minimized the narratives presented by the two parties most
intimately involved in the case. Korematsu's narrative and even his identity were
kept hidden to avoid highlighting the actual individual tragedy and racially inflam-
matory issues. Similarly, the narratives of General DeWitt and his supporters were
minimized because of their inconclusiveness and inflammatory content. The
Court's own narrative minimized the stories told by the parties who were personally
part of the Japanese internment. Instead, the majority relied on other kinds of
narratives.
2. The Court's Selection of Its Narratives
The Court basically relied on (1) its narrative in the Hirabayashi opinion
(which had upheld a military curfew based on Japanese ancestry), (2) the narrative
contained within the Justice Department's brief, and (3) empirical data.
a. The Hirabayashi Opinion
In Korematsu, the Court cited its factual conclusions within Hirabayashi v.
United States.2 17 About eighteen months before deciding Korematsu, the Court in
Hirabayashi upheld a military order issued by DeWitt that imposed a curfew based
on Japanese ancestry. In Hirabayashi, the Court held that Congress and the Presi-
dent, acting together, were within the war power in authorizing military orders, such
as the curfew.2 18 The Court furthermore held that the curfew order, although dis-
criminating based on race, did not violate due process.2 1 9 Finally, the Court held
that the promulgation of the curfew order by General DeWitt was not based on an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.22 ° The Cou'rt appeared to give two
conflicting messages about the legal basis for its conclusions. First, the Court indi-
cated that there was a "reasonable basis"22 1 for the government's actions and relied
on socioeconomic data showing the insularity of the Japanese American community
and its location near military-industrial sites.2 22 Second, the Court repeatedly em-
phasized the need to allow military authorities unreviewable discretion in emergent
wartime situations.22 3
Throughout its opinion in Hirabayashi, the Court emphasized that the govern-
ment had a "reasonable basis" and "ample ground" for its belief that the Japanese
American community represented a serious threat of espionage and sabotage. 224 For
factual support, the Court summarized the socioeconomic data contained in the
217. 320 U.S. 81 (1942).
218. See id. at 98-99.
219. See id. at 100-02.
220. See id. at 102-04.
221. Id. at 101.
222. See id. at 96-98.
223. See, e.g., id. at 99 ("Like every military control of the population of a dangerous zone in war time, it
necessarily involves some infringement of individual liberty .... ").
224. See, e.g., id. at 94 ("That reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our national
defense had ample ground ... cannot be doubted."); id. at 95 ("reasonable ground for believing.... ."); id. at
98 ("Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded .... ."); id. at 101 ("the challenged orders
and statute afforded a reasonable basis .. .
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government's brief.225 This material was conclusory and result-oriented, but it was
also statistical and carefully footnoted. It included speculations, such as that Japa-
nese citizens and aliens had been discriminated against by laws preventing their inte-
gration into society generally, which may have caused "irritation""" and which
could have encouraged "attachments '22 7 to Japan; that Japanese American children
were sent to Japanese language schools, which may have been sources of Japanese
propaganda; that Japan permitted dual citizenship, discouraging the breaking of ties
with Japan; that a "large number" '2 28 of resident Japanese aliens had leadership posi-
tions in their communities and posed a possible threat; and that the "association of
influential Japanese residents with Japanese Consulates"22 9 could serve as a possible
means for the communication of propaganda.2 31 While the Court appeared to rely
on this socioeconomic data as its reasonable basis for supporting the significant risk
posed by the Japanese American community, it did not provide any data to support
whether the particular means-the curfew-was necessary or reasonable.
Although the Court in Hirabayashi made repeated claims that there was a rea-
sonable basis for the government's actions,2 3 1 it also suggested that military authori-
ties possessed some unreviewable discretion in emergent wartime situations.2 3 2 For
example, Justice Black's majority opinion announced that
[w]here, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and
discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for
any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment
for theirs. 23
3
The Court also emphasized the need to accord military authorities wide discre-
tion for wartime exigencies. 234 Finally, the Court indicated that so long as there was
any evidentiary support, it would not strike down a military curfew on constitu-
tional grounds.2 35
Which of the double messages was the most telling? Scholarly commentators
have concluded that the Court required a reasonable basis in Hirabayashi, pointing
to the socioeconomic data236 or to the Court's rhetoric. 2 37 I believe, however, that
225. See Brief for the United States at 18-32, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (No.
870), reprinted in 40 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 269, 296-310.
226. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 98.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See id. But see Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 124 (pointing out that restricting
ethnic affiliations of this sort denies constitutional rights of association). The Court also reviewed the history
of the legislative act, executive order, and military order to demonstrate their relationships. See Hirabayashi,
320 U.S. at 98-99. The Court in Korematsu also summarized some of this information. See Korematsu, 323
U.S. at 216-17.
231. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
233. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
234. Id. (noting that war power under the Constitution allows the President and Congress "wide scope
for the exercise of judgment and discretion").
235. See id. at 101; see also id. at 99.
236. Professor tenBroek contends that the Court applied a reasonable basis test in Hirabayashi, but al-
lowed military authorities unreviewable discretion in Korematsu out of "convenience." tenBroek, supra note
39, at 318-19. He reasons that the decision to allow a military order requiring exclusion should mandate a
greater justification than one requiring a curfew. See id. at 316. But, he argues, it was easier for the Court to
avoid providing a greater justification for exclusion by permitting wide military discretion. See id. at 319.
Furthermore, he notes that if the Court did perform a substantive review in Korematsu, it was a very weak
standard. See id. at 318-19. I agree with his latter conclusion, but disagree that the best explanation is based
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the Court in Hirabayashi required only a showing of good-faith suspicion or, alter-
natively, that it acknowledged that there existed a discrete amount of unreviewable
discretion. I base this interpretation on the separate opinions of individual Justices
in Hirabayashi and on an examination of the socioeconomic data the Court inserted
into its opinion.
The separate opinions of individual Justices show that the Court was fractured
as to the proper standard of review. In his concurrence in Hirabayashi, Justice
Douglas argued that the Court could not possibly know the facts influencing the
military order because it was issued at a time of "dire emergency. '2 38 Furthermore,
military authorities should not be expected to wait until investigations or hearings
were completed.239 Thus, so long as the military order had "some relation" 240 to
protecting against espionage and sabotage, the Court should uphold it.2"' In a sepa-
rate concurring opinion, Justice Murphy wrote that the military order was issued in
"complete good faith."2 42 He further emphasized that it was "allowable"24 3 because
the military was confronted with an imminent emergency.244 Finally, Justice Rut-
ledge indicated that courts may possess power to review some actions of military
officers in emergency situations but felt that it was unnecessary to define the limits
of military authorities in that case.245 Thus, Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rut-
ledge wrote separately to indicate their belief that there were limits to the discretion
the Court granted to military authorities. That these Justices felt a need to write
separate opinions in Hirabayashi suggests that the Court was giving wide latitude to
the military order.24 6 If there was any substantive review, it was minimal.
Moreover, the Court did not rely on the socioeconomic data to decide whether
to uphold the curfew order. Instead, the Court's decision was guided principally by
a more general perception of the importance of preserving flexibility for military
authority during the exigencies of war. It appears unlikely that the Court seriously
analyzed the socioeconomic data. The Court lifted this information in summary
fashion from the government's brief.24 7 The Court's opinion and the government's
brief did not offer details about how the statistical information was calculated, much
less its strengths or weaknesses. The socioeconomic data represented a one-sided,
after-the-fact justification, and not a thoughtful and careful explication based on
empiricism. Even if completely true, the socioeconomic data provided an extremely
attenuated link to the actual justification for the curfew order. The Court made an
on the "convenience" of switching the standard of review between Hirabayashi and Korematsu, which were
decided about a year apart on closely related issues.
237. See Rostow, supra note 21, at 505, 508 (acknowledging that the Court ignored the rational basis
requirement "for all practical purposes," but nevertheless went through "great lengths" to articulate the im-
portance of its function of protecting against arbitrary military action).
238. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring).
241. See id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 109 (Murphy, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 113 (Murphy, J., concurring).
244. See id. (Murphy, J., concurring). Justice Murphy dissented in Korematsu based in part on the non-
emergent nature of that decision. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). He required a
reasonable basis in that circumstance. See id. at 235.
245. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
246. The separate opinions in Korematsu, especially by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, also suggest that
they had joined the Court in Hirabayashi based on their belief that the Court was according unreviewable
discretion to military authorities in exigencies during war. See infra notes 408.
247. Compare Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 96-98, with brief cited supra note 225.
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improbable logical leap in linking Japanese language schools in the United States to
the threat of espionage and sabotage. This was not even information General De-
Witt considered; even more likely, he would not have found it helpful.
In reality, the Court did not require a documented factual basis for its decision.
Since Hirabayashi was decided two-and-a-half years after the bombing of Pearl Har-
bor, the government could not have used the bombing as an actual reason for the
military decision to exclude based on racial ancestry. General DeWitt had not yet
published his Final Report. Moreover, the Brief for the United States was totally
devoid of any reference to the actual justifications given by General DeWitt.2 48 The
trial record did not indicate the facts actually considered by the military authorities
who had imposed the curfew.24 9 Finally, the government had conceded in the
course of the litigation that "no charge of espionage, sabotage or treasonable activity
had been made against anyone of Japanese American ancestry at the time of the
evacuation order here in question."25 ° Thus, the Court's inclusion of the socioeco-
nomic data was entirely for persuasive, symbolic purposes. Despite its rhetoric to
the contrary, the Court in Hirabayashi gave military authorities substantial discre-
tion and did not require any documented factual basis.
The Court in Korematsu cited Hirabayashi and its language indicating that sub-
stantial discretion should be accorded to military authorities. Specifically, the Court
quoted Hirabayashi as saying, "we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress [and that w]e cannot say that the war-making
branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that [there was a
public necessity for the exclusion]." 2 5I The Court in Korematsu, however, could not
merely repeat the narrative containing the socioeconomic data found in Hirabayashi.
The exclusion order, reviewed in Korematsu, was a far greater deprivation of liberty
than the curfew order.252 Thus, even though the curfew order was justified, the
Korematsu Court could not necessarily justify the exclusion order on the same basis.
Because the actual justifications for the military order were available, the government
was required to rely on the real reasons for the curfew rather than on conceivable
justifications as it had in Hirabayashi.253 Thus, the Court turned to the narrative
offered by the Justice Department in its brief.
b. The Justice Department's Narrative
The Justice Department faced a difficult problem as to the factual basis for the
imposition of the exclusion order. It could and did rely on the conclusions reached
248. See generally brief cited supra note 225.
249. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1942) (No. 870),
reprinted in 40 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 361, 365-66.
250. Id. at 370.
251. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99) (emphasis added).
252. The Court in Korematsu acknowledged this point. See id. However, the Court also stated that the
government authorities concluded that the curfew order "provided inadequate protection" in "defending our
shores," thereby legitimizing the exclusion order. See id. The Court did not offer any specific information
why this was true.
253. The only information before the Court in Hirabayashi about General DeWitt's actual reasons for his
actions was a report published in a newspaper which contained a snippet of his testimony before the House
Naval Affairs Subcommittee: "A Jap's a Jap and it makes no difference whether he is an American or not."
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 32-33, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. at 214 (1944) (No. 22),
reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 39-40. See Dembitz, supra note 47. It was the appel-
lant, of course, and not the government who provided the only available information concerning General
DeWitt's actual justifications.
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by the Court in Hirabayashi.254 Yet, the government must have been aware that the
socioeconomic data that had provided the factual basis in Hirabayashi could not
serve to legitimize exclusion because the actual justification for the military order
had subsequently become known. 5  General DeWitt's Final Report was published
after the Court decided Hirabayashi, but prior to the Court's decision in Korematsu.
Because of information obtained during the course of the relitigation of Hirabayashi
and Korematsu in the 1980s, we now know that the War Department was quite
upset 256 upon learning that General DeWitt was publishing his Final Report and had
complained because of its tone and substance.
Although DeWitt resisted wholesale changes, the War Department suggested
approximately fifty-five changes to correct the final draft.25 7 An example of a result-
ing change in tone258 was the deletion of a portion that contended that it was not
feasible to separate the "'sheep from the goats,' 2 59 replacing it with the phrase, "a
positive determination could not have been made."260 An important change in sub-
stance was the deletion of General DeWitt's original position that the reason for the
internment was that it would never be possible to separate the loyal from the dis-
loyal. 261' General DeWitt had contended that this meant that the internment of all
those of Japanese ancestry would be required for the entire duration of the war.262
Although General DeWitt's believed that individual hearings could have been con-
ducted in a timely manner, he nonetheless believed it impossible to determine the
loyalty of those of Japanese ancestry.26 3 The War Department revised DeWitt's
position to the view later adopted by the Court in Korematsu-there was not enough
time to separate the loyal from the disloyal prior to the internment.2 64 Because
DeWitt resisted the complete revision of the Final Report,265 the government was
still left to explain a document that had a racially inflammatory tone and conclu-
sions based merely on DeWitt's suspicions. Thus, it was not surprising that the
government's brief did not rely on the Final Report,2 66 while the petitioner's brief
repeatedly referred to it to show racist motivation.
267
254. Brief for the United States at 44-47, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1943), 42
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 246-49.
255. See supra note 202 (discussing the only direct evidence presented on the issue of sabotage and
espionage).
256. John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, was "more than a little exercised because the Final Report
had been printed in final form and distributed without any prior consultation by the Western Defense
Command with the War Department about its contents." Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445,
1450 (W.D. Wash. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987),
257. See Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1451. The Justice Department was apparently unaware of the War
Department's intervention. See id. at 1454.
258. Id. at 1451.
259. Id. at 1452. (Emphasis in original)
260. Id. (Emphasis in original)
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 1453.
265. See id. at 1450.
266. See Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22),
reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 213 (asking the Court to rely on the Final Report only to
the extent relied on in the brief for facts concerning the "actual evacuation and the events that took place
subsequent thereto"); see also id. at 224-26 (failing to mention Final Report in description of justification for
exclusion and internment).
267. See Brief for Appellant at 56-77, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), re-
printed in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 154-75. The petitioner described the Final Report as a
"Fantastic colored report." Id. at 154.
UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:72
Although it did not reiterate the socioeconomic data presented in Hirabayashi,
the government's brief in Korematsu relied heavily on the Hirabayashi Court's con-
clusions. In addition, the Justice Department created its own narrative by essentially
"washing" DeWitt's narrative of its inflammatory details and specific examples.
This resulted in the conclusory, non-specific language in the government's brief.268
Furthermore, in a now-famous footnote in the government's brief, the Justice De-
partment asked the Court to rely on its factual justifications rather than those in the
Final Report.269 The government avoided references to the Final Report. In fact, for
factual support, the government only cited generally to two articles written by an
anonymous intelligence officer published in popular magazines.27
The Court relied on the government's brief, although it did not explicitly cite
it. The government's brief contained a narrative that lacked factual specificity. The
Court appeared to rely on the government's brief when it stated: "The military
authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, con-
cluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion." 2 7 1 The
Court also appeared to refer to this narrative when it concluded that the factual basis
for the means used rested on the impossibility of segregating the loyal from the
disloyal immediately.2 72 There is an air of mystery surrounding the Court's unex-
plained announcement that "an unascertained number of disloyal members [existed
in the Japanese American community.] 2 73 This high degree of ambiguity may have
led Justice Black to cite to empirical data obtained in a questionnaire survey of
interned citizens over a year after the internment had been initiated.274 In a sense,
this data provided the appearance of specificity and empiricism otherwise lacking in
Korematsu.
c. Symbolic Reliance on Empirical Data
The Court stated that the exclusion of all those of "Japanese origin "275 was
based on a military imperative rather than on group punishment. The military im-
perative resulted from the inability to separate immediately the loyal from the dis-
loyal. As evidence for the need for exclusion based on Japanese ancestry, the Court
stated that some of those who were interned "retained loyalties to Japan. ' 27 6 It then
offered the empirical support that "[approximately five thousand American citizens
of Japanese ancestry refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and
to renounce allegiance to the Japanese Emperor, and several thousand evacuees re-
268. See Brief for the United States at 11-12, 20-23, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 213-14, 222-25.
269. See id. at 213 n.2.
270. See id. at 12 n.3 (citing to articles published in HARPER'S and FORTUNE magazines).
271. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. The government's brief offered a similar conclusory statement. See
Brief for the United States at 22-23, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in
42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 224-25.
272. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. The Court referred to its factual conclusion on this issue in Hira-
bayashi and then stated that the factual basis was the same for the exclusion order. The government's brief
offered this same conclusion. See Brief for the United States at 22-23, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 224-25.
273. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. The Court appeared to be repeating what was contained in the govern-
ment's brief. See Brief for the United States at 22-23, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No.
22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 224-25.
274. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
275. Id. at 218.
276. Id. at 219.
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quested repatriation to Japan. ' '2 77 At first glance, this statistical evidence appears
impressive. The possibility that thousands of Japanese American citizens were dis-
loyal was a powerful statement. The quantification of large numbers created a feel-
ing that the Court was objective. Because of the powerful image these statistics
created, the Court deliberately chose this particular empirical "fact" out of the uni-
verse of facts and narratives from the congressional hearings and the Final Report.
The Court clearly offered this quantitative evidence to persuade rather than- to
describe how it decided the case. Granted, the empirical information had limited
relevance. For example, if the Court were requiring a good-faith suspicion of a risk
of espionage and sabotage, this questionnaire might have been germane. The most
striking feature of the empirical facts, however, is their inaccessability to analysis.
Surely the Court would have offered more detail about what questions were asked
and the methodology of the questionnaire study if it considered this to be important
evidence. On closer analysis, the statistical evidence was extremely weak for what
the Court wanted to prove. The Court relied upon a questionnaire administered
approximately a year after the incarceration began. Thus, military authorities did
not rely on this evidence when they decided to impose the exclusion order. Further-
more, the questionnaire was hardly a valid means of determining risk of espionage or
subversive activity. Many refused to swear unqualified allegiance to protest the con-
ditions of the internment camps or to avoid military service.27 8 However, even if
this evidence were relevant, the underlying premise must have been that the ques-
tionnaire was a valid instrument in separating the loyal from the disloyal. If that
were true, it could have been administered in the eleven-month interval between the
bombing of Pearl Harbor and the completion of the internment. Moreover, other
empirical data were more relevent. The most telling post-internment statistic was
that not a single person of Japanese ancestry in the United States was ever convicted
of sabotage or espionage. 7 9 The petitioner's brief in Korematsu noted this to be true
at the time the case was being decided-approximately two-and-a-half years after the
military order was issued.280 Clearly, the Court's use of the questionnaire data was
not based on an objective search for the most relevant empirical facts.
The Court could not have seriously believed that the questionnaire data was a
reasonable justification for the exclusion of over 100,000 people from their homes.
Without providing any individual or categorical exemptions, much less individual
277. Id.
278. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 4, at 188-97. The two questions regarding loyalty were
part of a long list of questions. Question 27 asked whether the draft-age males would serve in combat,
wherever ordered, and asked others whether they would join some other part of the military. Question 28
asked:
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the
United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of
allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or
organization?
Id. at 192.
Some of the internees did not answer "yes" to both questions, because living conditions were poor and
their lives outside the camps were disrupted. The internees did not know how their answers would be used.
Many were afraid that if they answered "yes" they would be placed in the segregated army units and separated
from their families. Others thought that Question 28 was a trick question so that if they answered in the
affirmative they would be admitting prior allegiance to the emperor. Of the 77,957 internees who were
surveyed, less than ten percent (5,300) answered "no" to Question 28, the loyalty question. See id. at 192-95.
279. HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R. DUcAT, EDWARD S. CORWIN'S THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT
IT MEANS TODAY 105 (1978).
280. Brief for Appellant at 63, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in
42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 161.
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determinations of risk, General DeWitt's military orders excluded even the physi-
cally handicapped, mentally retarded, psychologically disabled, young children, dis-
abled elderly, and other traditionally "vulnerable" groups from their own home.2 8'
Prior to the internment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had already
conducted a sweep with summary arrests of individuals, including those of Japanese,
Italian, and German ancestry, who were suspected of being disloyal.2 82 Thus, the
Court was seeking to justify the exclusion of the remaining Japanese American pop-
ulace whom even the FBI, directed by J. Edgar Hoover, did not find a need to detain
or arrest.
The Court presented the questionnaire data not to show how it arrived at a
decision but as a symbolic reference to the latent record of the case. The Court
chose this empirical fact to avoid referring to the inflammatory overtones of the
narratives by General DeWitt and his supporters. The Court's reference to quantita-
tive evidence created an impression of objectivity. Logically, the evidence may have
had some relevance in establishing mere suspicion. Yet the Court did not present
the questionnaire data in a manner that allowed for logical analysis. The evidence
was presented as a metaphor rather than relevant empirical fact. Therefore, the fac-
tual basis for the exclusion order in Korematsu rested primarily on the narrative con-
tained in the government's brief.
3. The Court's Narrative About Its Standard of Review
The text of the Korematsu opinion appears analytically muddled because it con-
tains both explicit and implicit references to several different standards of judicial
review. These include requirements of (1) strict scrutiny, (2) reasonable basis, (3)
reasonable suspicion, and (4) unreviewable discretion.28 3 An additional peculiarity
is that while the most rigorous standard of review-strict scrutiny-was stated dra-
matically, the less rigorous standards better fit the actual basis of the Court's deci-
sion. As discussed above, the actual factual basis for the exclusion order rested
primarily on the Justice Department's narrative rather than on the justification of-
fered by General DeWitt. The Korematsu Court's willingness to rely on conclusory
and derivative narratives could be consistent with a standard of review based on
reasonable suspicion or unreviewable discretion. However, the Justice Department's
"suspicion" would not satisfy strict scrutiny, nor would it provide a reasonable basis.
Strict Scrutiny: The Court most visibly pronounced its standard of review in the
preface to its analysis. The preface contained the Court's now-renowned declaration
281. Because young men were either conscripted into the segregated military units or detained by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the relocation centers were largely inhabited by the aged, infirm,
children, and women. See Harrop A. Freeman, Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414, 443
(1942-43), reprinted in THE MASS INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL
REDRESS 90, 119 (Charles McClain ed., 1994). See also Brief for Appellant at 76, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (No. 22), reprinted in 42 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 50, at 174.
282. Many of those arrested were leaders of Japanese communities. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED,
supra note 4, at 54-55. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered the apprehension of 2,192 Japanese, 1,393
Germans, and 264 Italians. The arrests were based on three categories. Category A included aliens who were
leaders of cultural organizations. Category B included "slightly less suspicious" aliens. Id. at 54. Category C
included members of or those who donated to ethnic groups, Japanese language teachers, and Buddhist
clergy. See id. Citizens were not arrested unless there was probable cause. See id.
283. These four possible standards of review contrast with the Court's present reliance on three stan-
dards: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and a rational basis requirement. While the Korematsu Court's
referral to a reasonable basis appears to be the equivalent of the modern rational basis requirement, there is no
similar modern equal protection standard that would be equivalent to the reasonable suspicion analysis. The
Court in Korematsu did not appear to rely on an equivalent of the modern intermediate scrutiny test.
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that when the government creates racial classifications that infringe on the civil liber-
ties of a racial group, these restrictions are "immediately suspect,"284 and the Court
will impose the "most rigid scrutiny. ' 28 5 The Court further observed that while
"[p]ressing public necessity may [serve as a valid government objective,] racial antag-
onism never can." 286 The Court went on to require a "definite and close [means-
ends] relationship" 28 7 and to declare that only the "apprehension by the proper mili-
tary authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety"288 could have
justified the exclusion order.289
Was the Court announcing its standard of review or was it merely protesting as
it sought to provide reassurance that it was trying to be fair? Clearly, the Court was
involved in the latter. The Court did not actually strictly scrutinize the govern-
ment's objectives. It did not provide any specific evidence supporting the military
necessity for the exclusion beyond the cursory allusion to the questionnaire data; nor
was there any effort to explain or discredit the racist narratives supporting the mili-
tary order. Furthermore, the Court did not explain why less restrictive alternatives,
such as individual hearings or exemptions for those who represented an extremely
low risk of espionage or sabotage, were not feasible.
Contextually, the prefatory paragraph declaring the appropriateness of strict
scrutiny has the appearance of an apology. In actuality, the Court applied "the
principles [it] announced in the Hirabayashi case."'2 9 In Hirabayashi, the Court
held that "it [was] enough that circumstances within the knowledge of those charged
with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis
for the decision which they made. " 29i The Court thus abruptly changed its lan-
guage and approach in Korematsu once it began to analyze the government's justifi-
cations. Justice Black probably inserted the prefatory paragraph to deflect criticism
of the Court's refusal to oppose the hysteria and racism motivating the Japanese
internment.29 2 Confronted with overtly inflammatory and racist narratives by Gen-
eral DeWitt and his supporters, Justice Black reacted by emphasizing that he was
being fair even though he was siding with them.
Although the Court did not in fact impose the "most rigid scrutiny" 293 or
require a "definite and close [means-ends] relationship, '294 these terms were care-
fully selected for their symbolism.2 95 The phrase, "most rigid scrutiny," 2 96 closely
284. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 218. Similarly, the Court stated that only "circumstances of direst emergency and peril" could
justify the government's reliance on exclusion orders. Id. at 220.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 218. Similarly, the Court stated that only "circumstances of direst emergency and peril" could
justify the government's reliance on exclusion orders. Id. at 220.
290. Id. at 217.
291. Hiraybayashi, 320 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added). See CHRSITOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF
WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918, at 263 (1989).
292. Apparently, the prefatory paragraph was inserted only in the last draft that Justice Black circulated
to court members after he read the strong dissents written by Justices Murphy and Robert. See IRONS,
JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 9, at 340.
293. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
294. Id.
295. Professor Paul Brest concluded that "Mr. Justice Black chose the word 'suspect" advisedly." Brest,
supra note 135, at 7. He believes that the reason for this standard of review is based on lessons from "our
history and traditions [which] provide strong reasons to suspect that racial classifications ultimately rest on
assumptions of the differential worth of groups." Id. Thus, Professor Brest believed that the word "suspect"
was a term-of-art tied to heightened scrutiny. He noted that Professor John Kaplan instead believed that the
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tracks the "more searching judicial inquiry' 297 suggested by Justice Stone in footnote
four of Carolene Products, when the Court considered statutes that harmed "discrete
and insular minorities." 298  The Court's lack of seriousness about imposing strict
scrutiny manifested itself in several ways, however. Because Korematsu was decided
prior to Brown v. Board of Education,299 the Court still examined statutes that im-
posed racial classifications according to a rational basis requirement. Imposing strict
scrutiny would have been a significant departure from this established standard of
review. Yet, in declaring this to be the standard, the Court did not suggest how it
would be applied to the facts nor did it give any reasons to justify the suggested new
standard. It did not even cite to Carolene Products' footnote four for support.
Clearly, the Court's use of this language was basically a rhetorical gesture rather than
an effort to provide a new analytical framework.
Reasonable Basis: The Korematsu Court's apparent reliance on a reasonable ba-
sis test was not explicitly stated anywhere in the opinion. But its crucial implied
presence is derivable from the Court's reliance on the Hirabayashi case, which the
Court acknowledged, gave "serious consideration" 30 0 to similar matters. The Court
in Hirabayashi explicitly applied a reasonable basis test.30 ' In Korematsu, the Court
also suggested that it was applying a reasonable basis requirement. For example, the
Court pointedly noted that authorities had concluded that the curfew order, by
itself, was "inadequate, "302 and called the exclusion order "necessary."303 Further-
more, the Court contended that the individual hardships were outweighed by the
exigencies of war, and thus implied a reasonable balancing of interests.30 4
However, as noted above, the Court did not supply enough specific informa-
tion to support a reasonable basis for an exclusion order or to demonstrate a reason-
able relationship between the chosen means and ends. Certainly the passing
reference to the questionnaire data did not satisfy a rational basis requirement, espe-
cially given the Court's unwillingness to analyze this empirical information in a
meaningful way. A reasonable basis requirement had before been used to strike
word simply meant "disfavored." Id. From a positive standpoint, I believe that both Professors Brest and
Kaplan were correct. Justice Black deliberately chose the special term as a symbol to indicate that the Court
imposed a heightened review, but did not actually conduct such a review. Thus, the Court's conduct shows
that it simply meant the term "suspect" to mean "disfavored," although its narrative suggested that a special
kind of review was imposed.
296. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
297. United States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
298. Id.
299. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
300. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217.
301. See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95. Professors tenBroek and Rostow separately concluded that
Hirabayashi applied a reasonable basis test, although Professor Rostow was highly critical of the weakness of
its application. See tenBroek, supra note 39, at 183; Rostow, supra note 21, at 505.
302. Korematusu, 323 U.S. at 218.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 219.
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down every governmental classification based on race perceived to be unequal. 30 5 A
reasonable basis requirement was not satisfied in Korematsu.3 °6
Reasonable Suspicion: The Korematsu Court's explicit declaration that it was ap-
plying "the most rigid scrutiny" 30 7 and relying on Hirabayashi, which in turn pur-
portedly relied on a reasonable basis requirement, created the appearance that the
standard of review required more than mere suspicion by military authorities. Some
of the language and the logic in the Court's opinion implied that it was applying a
reasonable suspicion requirement. The Court cited language from Hirabayashi that
was more consistent with a reasonable suspicion requirement rather than a reason-
able basis test. This language included the phrases, "we cannot reject as un-
founded"30 8 and "[wie cannot say that the war-making branches of the government
did not have ground for believing." 30 9 Moreover, the Court's insistence that "racial
antagonism " 3 1° could never justify the exclusion suggested that the government's
suspicion must at least be reasonable. The Court's emphasis on the temporary,
emergent nature of the decisionmaking at issue supports the view that military au-
thorities had no time to create a record showing a reasonable basis. The Court could
then permit decisionmaking based on suspicion that "an unascertained number of
disloyal members of the group"3 11 could not be identified in the requisite time.
312
As discussed above, the questionnaire data may have had some relevance if
reasonable suspicion were the standard of review. It could show that military au-
thorities had a suspicion that was not wholly based on racial antagonism. Similarly,
the government's narrative in its brief had relevance, even though it excluded the
racial inflammatory details of General DeWitt's narrative. On the other hand, Gen-
eral DeWitt's narrative comprised the most important information under a reason-
able suspicion requirement. It proclaimed the decisionmaker's actual reasons for
imposing the exclusion order. If the Court had logically analyzed General DeWitt's
narrative, it would have acknowledged the narrative's inflammatory tone and sub-
stance and pointed out that the exclusion could-or could not-be justified by a
separate non-racist rationale. The Court's lack of articulateness makes it impossible
to know if the Justices were requiring a reasonable suspicion or establishing a zone of
unreviewable discretion held by military authorities.
Unreviewable Discretion: The implications of the Court's logic, rather than its
specific language, 3 13 suggest that the Court may have accorded unreviewable discre-
tion to DeWitt and other military authorities. The Court's analysis centered around
305. Thus, Hirabayashi and Korematsu were the first, and to this day, only cases in which the Court
upheld racial classifications created by the government despite their perceived egregious effects. See Hiraba-
yashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we have
sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of the United States based upon the
accident of race or ancestry."); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that only twice, in modern equal protection jurisprudence, has racial classification been allowed as an
appropriate means to serve a compelling governmental interest).
306. Professor Rostow concluded that the Court did "not pretend to review even the possible founda-
tions of such a judgment." Rostow, supra note 21, at 509. Professor tenBroek believed that the Court in
effect concluded that the Constitution was "suspended." tenBroek, supra note 39, at 184.
307. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
308. Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99).
309. Id. (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99).
310. Id. at 216.
311. Id. at 218.
312. Id. at 218-19.
313. In comparison, the Court in Hirabayashi made statements which explicitly supported non-review-
able discretion. It announced that
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whether DeWitt's actions were within the war powers of the government, implying
that the Court was not making a substantive judgment about the correctness of these
actions. 31 4 The Court stressed the emergency character of the military action and
hinted at the limits of the Court's review to avoid displacing military judgment.
The opinion contained language such as: "when, under conditions of modern war-
fare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger." 315 This passage implies that the Court
focused simply on whether the means were consistent with the war power held by
Congress and the President.
If the Court were in fact recognizing unreviewable discretion, this would ex-
plain why Justice Black found it unnecessary to review General DeWitt's narrative.
Therefore, the Court's reliance on the questionnare data and the Justice Depart-
ment's account can be explained by their persuasive appeal rather than logical rele-
vance. Because of the Court's failure to provide factual support for its holding, some
commentators who have closely analyzed Korematsu have concluded that the Court
found that the discretion held by military authorities was unreviewable.
3 16
Summary: The language of the Court's narrative in Korematsu most explicitly
and dramatically highlighted its application of strict scrutiny, while lesser levels of
review were accorded decreasing explicit reference. The Court's reliance on unre-
viewable discretion held by military authorities was the least explicit. The unreview-
able discretion standard could only be inferred from the opinion's logic. Yet the
factual basis of the Court's decision discloses that the standards of review most likely
to have been actually relied upon were the two most deferential levels: either reason-
able suspicion or unreviewable discretion.
B. The Relationship Between Narratives and Interpretation
The Court's inclusion and exclusion of various narratives in Korematsu may
seem puzzling. The selection of narratives does not appear to be based on how the
narratives are logically related to the Court's interpretation. There appears to be no
logical interpretive-narrative link. By "interpretive-narrative link," I mean the de-
scription given by the Court of the relationship between a given narrative and the
Court's interpretation. Why include the narrative cryptically describing question-
naire data while at the same time exclude the detailed narrative by General DeWitt?
An interpretive-narrative link requires an answer to this question. This section con-
siders the possibility that the choice of inclusion and exclusion was not to underscore
their logical relevance but to highlight what the Court perceived to be the most
persuasive presentation.
(w]here, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the
choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constiution has placed the
responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or
substitute its judgment for theirs.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
314. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18.
315. Id. at 219-20; see also id. at 217 (quoting executive order which states that "'the successful prosecu-
tion of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage'"); id. (not beyond
the war power to exclude).
316. See, e.g., tenBroek, supra note 39, at 184; Rostow, supra note 21, at 508-09.
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1. A Decisionmaking Model of Narrative Selection
In order to discern the role of logic and persuasion in the selection and inter-
pretation of narratives in a judicial opinion, it is fruitful to consider a decisionmak-
ing model that describes an interplay between two different levels of allocation. The
first-order determination selects a subset of narratives from the universe of available
narratives. The Court included such a subset of narratives in its opinion. The selec-
tion of this subset may be based on various criteria. To illustrate the criteria used in
Korematsu, for example, we can see that the Court could have relied on the logical
relevance or, in the alternative, the persuasiveness of the narratives.3 17 Once such a
decision is made, a second-order determination still has to be made. This determi-
nation requires a decision as to what meaning should be attributed to a specific
narrative. The narrative may be used to show logical consistency with the Court's
interpretation or, alternatively, it may be used in a persuasive manner. The criteria
used in the second-order determination may be the same or different from what we
used in the first-order determination.
Based on the prior discussion, the Court was confronted with five narratives
when it wrote Korematsu: (1) Korematsu's narrative about his identity and how he got
arrested, (2) General DeWitt's narrative, (3) language from the Hirabayshi opinion,
(4) the Justice Department's narrative, and (5) the questionnaire data. The Court
included only the last three narratives in the Korematsu opinion. This decision was
consistent with a first-order decision based on persuasiveness as the controlling crit -
rion for selection. The Court's exclusion of the narratives of Korematsu and General
DeWitt because of their racially* inflammatory nature was consistent with a persua-
sive presentation. Alternatively, it was consistent for the Court, in order to per-
suade, to include references to the Hirabayashi opinion, the Justice Department's
narrative, and the questionnaire data.
However, the Court's selection of narratives did not reflect a logical nexus be-
tween narratives and interpretation. Because there are at least two possible interpre-
tations of the Court's opinion-a standard of review based either on reasonable
suspicion or unreviewable discretion-we can consider each in turn. First, we can
consider the possibility that the Court's interpretation in Korematsu was that mili-
tary authorities should be accorded unreviewable discretion in certain emergency
wartime situations. If the Court in Korematsu made a first-order determination
based purely on the logical relevance to selected narratives, then we would-expect
inclusion of only the narrative relating to the Hirabayashi opinion. The Hirabayashi
opinion is logically relevant because it could be construed to be consistent with the
holding that military authorities should be accorded unreviewable discretion.3 18
The other narratives are not logically relevant to support this holding because the
justifications for the exclusion order are unnecessary to decide the case.3 19
We can consider the alternative possibility that the Court's interpretation was
that military authorities should be required to show that they held a reasonable
suspicion of public necessity. Arguably, Korematsu's narrative was the only narrative
317. Of course, the Court could also rely on some balanced mixture of both criteria, or consider other
criteria, such as dignitary concerns which may require the recognition of the narratives of the major parties
involved in the litigation. The models are discussed in their pure forms to show the Court's prioritization of
persuasive quality over logical relevance.
318. See supra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
319. The other narratives may, however, provide persuasive support that giving unreviewable discretion
was a reasonable decision.
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that should have been excluded because it was irrelevant to the reasonableness of the
military authorities' suspicions. 320 All the other narratives have some logical rele-
vance to this determination because they address how consistent the justifications
were with reasonable suspicion. Among these narratives, General DeWitt's narrative
provided the most probative evidence. General DeWitt's racially inflammatory nar-
rative was highly relevant because it signalled the danger that the commander was
ordering the exclusion based on racial prejudice. Incorporating the narrative in the
government's brief in a selectively summarized account was hardly an adequate
substitute.
The Court's exclusion of the narratives of Korematsu and General DeWitt and
its inclusion of narratives derived from Hirabayashi, the Justice Department, and the
questionnaire data are most consistent with a criterion based on persuasiveness.
Thus, the actual written opinion of Korematsu is consistent with a first-order deci-
sion based on the persuasive quality of the narratives rather than their logical
relevancy.
In the second-order determination, the Court similarly emphasized persuasive
appeal over logical relevancy in its presentation and explanation of the meaning of
the published narratives. The Court's assignment of meaning to the narratives it
chose to include was consistent with a second-order determination based on the
criteria of persuasiveness. None was portrayed as casting any doubt on the Court's
determination.
First, we might ask if the second-order determination were based on logical
relevance to a holding that the military authorites had unreviewable discretion.
Only the Court's treatment of the Hirabayashi opinion was plausibly consistent with
this criterion. The Court did not explain how the Justice Department's narrative or
the questionnaire data was relevant to the standard of unreviewable discretion. If
unreviewable discretion served as the basis for the Court's decision, the Court used
these two narratives in a persuasive, rather than logical, manner.
Next, we can consider if the second-order determination was based on logical
relevance to a holding that required a showing of reasonable suspicion. The Court's
reliance on Hirabayashi and the Justice Department's narrative may be consistent
with this criterion. However, the Court's use of the questionnaire data in a persua-
sive manner confirmed that it again chose to rely on persuasiveness and not logical
relevance as the criterion. Although the questionnaire data had some potential rele-
vance to showing the reasonableness of the suspicion held by military authorities, the
Court did not provide this logical explanation in its opinion. In the second-order
determination, the Court used the questionnaire data in a symbolic way rather than
as part of a logical analysis. Rather than explaining the meaning of the empirical
data, the Court brandished the limited empiricism in a grandiose manner without
serious analysis. Thus the Court's handling of this particular narrative was most
consistent with its reliance on persuasiveness as a criterion for both first- and second-
order determinations. Furthermore, the fact that the Court had a choice of relying
on either a logical or rhetorical approach at the second-order determination is con-
sistent with the view that there were two levels of decisionmaking. That is, if the
320. Korematsu's narrative might have become relevant if he had taken the position that the government
could have easily identified him as a loyal individual and excused him from the exclusion order. However, his
position was that the exclusion order was unconstitutional with respect to the entire class of Japanese Ameri-
cans. I believe, however, that it would have been better to dignify Korematsu by identifying him and at least
summarizing his narrative. Thus, "dignity" could serve as yet another criterion for including narratives.
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initial decision to include the narrative was based on either logical relevance or per-
suasiveness, the Court had to make a second decision about what meaning should be
assigned to the questionnaire data.
In Korematsu, the Court emphasized persuasiveness over logic in making its
first- and second-order determinations about which narratives to include and how to
treat these narratives within its opinion. The first-order determination based on the
persuasiveness test resulted in the exclusion of General DeWitt's narrative despite its
strong logical nexus with an interpretation based on reasonable suspicion. Alterna-
tively, a first-order determination based on persuasiveness resulted in the inclusion of
the Justice Department's narrative and the questionnaire data despite the lack of a
logical nexus with an interpretation based on unreviewable discretion. The second-
order determination, also based on the persuasiveness test, resulted in the Court's
use of the questionnaire data in a persuasive manner not logically connected to
either possible standard of review. Thus, there was an absence of a logical interpre-
tive-narrative link in both first- and second-order determinations.
The omission of General DeWitt's narrative demonstrated a possible interac-
tional relationship between the first- and second-order determinations. The decision
to base the first-order determination on persuasiveness-and thus to delete General
DeWitt's narrative-may have turned on the potential dissonance that would have
been created if General DeWitt's narrative had been included in the Court's opin-
ion. If the first-order determination had permitted General DeWitt's narrative to be
included in the Court's opinion, then the second-order determination would have
been whether to present the narrative in either a logical or a persuasive manner.
Justice Black may have concluded that neither method was as effective as omitting
General DeWitt's narrative altogether. From a logical perspective, General DeWitt
cast serious doubt that there was even a reasonable suspicion or, alternatively, that it
would be irrelevant if military authorities had unreviewable discretion. From a rhe-
torical perspective, the inclusion of General DeWitt's narrative would have greatly
diminished the persuasiveness of the opinion because of its racially inflammatory
content. Thus, the potential dissonance at the second-order determination was
likely to have led Justice Black to make a first-order determination to exclude Gen-
eral DeWitt's narrative. 32 1
The most important observation is that the Court opinion in Korematsu failed
to explain in a logically coherent way the reasons for including narratives and as-
signing them meaning. I acknowledge that there may be legitimate reasons to in-
clude or exclude narratives not necessarily based on a "logically relevant"
321. In a different context, Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt observed that in situations of resource
scarcity where tragic choices must be made, society sometimes does change the criterion for first-order deter-
minations to avoid tragic second-order determinations. They called this phenomenon, "the first-order suffi-
ciency paradox." See GuiDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 134-136 (1978). The
determinations relating to the treatment of narratives in Korematsu were, however, not "tragic choices." Id. at
17-18. Tragic choices result from irresolvable clashes of fundamental values when forced to make distribu-
tional decisions of finite and scarce resources. Id. What is striking about Korematsu was that the Court made
an incorrect choice which conflicted with fundamental societal values, but which furthermore was avoidable
by the alternative. True, the Court's decision may not have been favorably received as a political matter, but
clearly in the long haul it could have been seen as a heroic decision consistent with our culture's values. It is a
myth that the wartime situation made the Court's decision too difficult. Indeed, the internment was being
disbanded, and the Court's decision in Korematsu had little practical impact, especially given that the Court
declared the internment illegal based on statutory interpretation in Endo. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 298-304.
The fact that the Court still made a mistake despite the lack of extreme exigency is why it may be thought of
as one of the worst decisions that the Court has ever made.
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explanation. Furthermore, there are certainly many kinds of logic other than logic
based on legal relevance. Explicitly stating such reasons could have assured that the
presence or absence of these narratives would not be misconstrued. For example,
although Fred Korematsu's identity and personal narrative were not logically relevant
to the Court's interpretation, the Court could-and indeed, should-have included
them and explained the inclusion as a recognition of the petitioner as a person de-
serving dignity and respect.
I am sensitive to the fact that the difference between logic and persuasion is
often quite indistinct. But even if one believed that the Court had logical explana-
tions for including or excluding each of these narratives, its failure to state these
reasons explicitly created an unnecessarily muddled and confusing opinion. The
Court could have stated, for example, that it was not relying on General DeWitt's
narrative because it had a racially inflammatory tone. Furthermore, the Court could
have indicated that it was relying instead on the narrative in the government's
brief-which abstracted the non-racist justifications from General DeWitt's re-
port-because it contained an adequate, although minimal, justification for the mil-
itary order.3 22 Similarly, the Court could have been forthright in acknowledging
that it was applying a reasonable basis test that recognized the importance of al-
lowing military authorities discretion when imposing restraints short of detention in
emergency situations during war. The Court could also have explained that its rul-
ing in Korematsu was extremely narrow and that in future situations, racial classifica-
tions would be subject to "the most rigid scrutiny. '32 3 Indeed, one might argue that
these explicit descriptions about the interpretive-narrative link would be both logical
and persuasive. But the salient point is that the Court did not do this. The Court
apparently was overconcerned with the persuasiveness of its opinion as opposed to
the importance of exposing its central logic when faced with what was a difficult
choice. Defining and explaining the interpretive-narrative link, would have clarified
the opinion's holding and prevented misleading future application through
exaggeration.
2. The Explicit/Inexplicit Nature of the Standard of Review
The failure of the Court to describe the relationship between its standard of
review and the factual basis for its decision resulted from rhetorical tendencies of
over- and under-emphasis. First, the Court escalated its rhetoric relating to the
highest standard of review. Second, the Court deemphasized the standards of review
comporting with the factual basis of its decision. The Court appeared to allow
virtually unreviewable discretion by military authorities, yet this conclusion could be
reached only through careful, if not laborious, implication.
The Court exaggerated in proclaiming that it was imposing the most rigid
scrutiny. This may be called "hyperbole" because it represents an escalation of rhet-
oric far in excess of reality.32 4 The Court proclaimed it was imposing strict scrutiny
322. I reject this conclusion because the facts stated by the Court and found in the government briefs are
mere conclusions without specific factual support. Justice Murphy in his dissent provided a concise criticism
of these conclusions. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235-238 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
323. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. But the Court appeared to be implying quite the opposite. It stated
that "all" racial classifications made by the government are subject to "the most rigid scrutiny." Id. Presuma-
bly, this included the case at issue.
324. Professor Robert Cover examined a similar phenomenon with respect to the writings of abolitionist
judges who were faced with the enforcement of slavery statutes. He described the tendency of judges to
accede to formalist requirements and to enforce the slavery statutes, although it appeared to be contrary to
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but, at the same time, avoided discussing the actual justifications offered by General
DeWitt. The rhetorical technique of hyperbole represents a way for the Court to
show that it was highly sensitive to the factual circumstances of the case but never-
theless claim that the Justices had no choice. This claim implied that the Court
should not be held morally culpable for its decision. By making this declaration and
by not acknowledging the inflammatory nature of General DeWitt's narrative, the
Court created its own narrative that avoided linking racially inflammatory overtones
of the actual justification with the Court's decision.
However, the Court exercised an impulse in the opposite rhetorical direction
when it described the standard of review actually imposed. The majority failed to
articulate explicitly their reliance on a highly deferential standard of review, although
the lack of factual record strongly implied as much. This approach may be called a
"present absence." The reader of the opinion becomes acutely aware of what the
Court is implicitly communicating. Thus, scholarly commentators who have parsed
the Korematsu opinion have concluded that it either acknowledged unreviewable
discretion 325 or formed its decision on negligible justification. 32 6  The rhetorical
purpose of present absence is to avoid the appearance of unfair treatment. If the
Court were allowing unreviewable discretion, only the narrative alluding to Hiraba-
yashi would have been logically relevant. Thus, the Court's explicit statement of its
high degree of judicial deference may have reduced the persuasiveness of an opinion
that contained other rhetorical justifications for the exclusion order.
While hyperbole and present absence represent techniques of exaggeration in
opposite directions, they share a common purpose. Their use results in a rhetorical
distancing of the Court's moral responsibility from the interpretation made.
Through an analogous over- and under-emphasis, the Court escaped defining its
interpretation and taking responsibility for its moral consequences. However, this
perceived advantage goes hand-in-hand with the disadvantage of a poorly defined
interpretation. We are left to guess the contours of the standard of review. The
Court failed to define the degree of judicial deference and the scope of allowable
military power. The technique of present absence causes the central meaning of the
opinion to be inaccessible because of its lack of explicit description. The Court's use
of hyperbole makes its exaggerated language both quotable and subject to misinter-
pretation by future courts. Thus, the Court's reliance on present absence and hyper-
bole demonstrated on another level the failure to establish an interpretive-narrative
link.
In summary, the Court's interpretative approach created a rift between rhetoric
and logic. This discontinuity did not invite-indeed, it rebuffed-discussion or
analysis of the opinion's legal meaning. As a result, the intuition that guided the
Court's selection of narratives and assigned meaning to them remained unexamined.
Readers of these narratives have failed to grasp where the Court's logic ends and
why. By failing to be forthright, the Court created a muddled opinion, which has
been subject to misinterpretation and even to manipulation. Many courts and
scholars later claimed that Korematsu was the first case to apply strict scrutiny to
their personal morality. Professor Cover noted that the judges in their opinions tended to "elevate the formal
stakes" to reduce this cognitive dissonance between formalism and the immorality of the result. See ROBERT
M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 227-29 (1975).
325. See, e.g., Rostow supra note 21, at 508-09; tenBroek, supra note 39, at 184.
326. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Foreword: The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 59 n.165 (1983) ("virtually automatic ratification").
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racial classifications created by the government. 32 7 The opinion also did nothing to
refute the notion that the very initiation of the internment was unjustified or was
not motivated, at least in a significant way, by racial prejudice. Indeed, the Court
needlessly gave legitimacy to the military orders at a time when the internment itself
was beginning to be disbanded and recognized as a mistake.328 Finally, the ambigu-
ity of the opinion made it more likely that judicial deference would be legitimized in
other remote situations because of the opinion's chameleonic meanings.
If there was any hope of confining the holding of Korematsu to the wartime
context, it was squandered by the Court's unwillingness to define in detail the limits
of the war power. Without doctrinal definition, Korematsu potentially has innumer-
able applications outside of the sphere of war making. In the absence of a precise
explanation of the basis for federal government authority, the opinion invites inter-
pretation based on its result alone. If the federal government could legitimately
exclude over 70,000 citizens from their homes based on their racial ancestry, it may
be possible for future courts to conclude afortiori that the federal government has
authority to encroach upon the liberties of individual criminal defendants, 32 9 resi-
dent aliens,330 or others33 who lack traditional due process.
III. PRIVILEGING ADJUDICATION BASED ON THE
INTERPRETIvE-NARRATIVE LINK
The Court's silent avoidance of confronting the question concerning whether
to overrule Korematsu is, of course, a kind of present absence. As described above,
the Court has had several opportunities to banish Korematsu from the domain of
equal protection jurisprudence, but has silently allowed those possibilities allow its
consequences to continue. The history of Korematsu's formulation and its subse-
quent influence as precedent shows how silence is an important form of expression.
The Court's refusal to acknowledge General DeWitt's narrative had a profound ef-
fect on the form and substance of the Korematsu opinion. The silencing of narra-
tives about the internment in the households of issei and nisei families after the war
delayed their coming to terms with this tragedy. The government bolstered the
silence when it opposed Korematsu's request for a public hearing and published
opinion about the relitigation of his case. The same time that silence about the
internment in issei and nisei families was being displaced by conversations, the
Court's express interpretations of Korematsu were being displaced by its reliance on
silence.
This recurrent silence represents an oppressive anxiety and also signifies a belief
in the futility of trying to resolve it. Most families of the internment were silent
because of their inability to cleanse themselves of this wrongdoing and their need for
extrinsic recognition of the injustice. The government opposed a public hearing and
judicial opinion because it feared public disfavor when the oppressive silence was
lifted. Similarly, the Court's reliance on silence as an interpretive method is an
implicit recognition that there is a need for judicial abstention in certain emergency
327. See Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 124, at 583 (noting that Korematsu "is widely
accepted to stand for the proposition that racial or national origin classifications warrant strict judicial
scrutiny").
328. See supra note 77.
329. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 357 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
330. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 n.13 (1965).
331. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 767 (1948) (federal post-war economic regulation).
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situations. Moreover, the concept that the government can in some future emer-
gency exclude civilians from their homes and place them in camps without due
process of law is justifiably frightening. But the Court's silence is implicit recogni-
tion of the necessity of keeping such a future option.
The history of Korematsu is also a story about a recurrent tendency toward
exaggeration. Justice Black exaggerated the strength of the government's justifica-
tions by including seemingly impressive empirical information of little actual rele-
vance. Furthermore, like Justice Holmes' declaration of "clear and present danger,"
Justice Black incorporated a bold statement declaring that the Court was being espe-
cially attentive. In light of the Court's recurring references to Korematsu's strict
scrutiny standard, it appears to be oblivious to the conclusion reached by scholarly
commentators that the Court was falsely describing what happened in that case.
Moreover, I believe that the latest claim that Korematsu is for all practical purposes
overruled represents a similar kind of exaggeration, no matter how well-meaning.
This exaggeration represents a deep-felt wish that justice has been completely
achieved, despite the tacit understanding that this has not happened. Exaggeration
fills the empty space left unoccupied by sound reason. The empirical questionnaire
data occupied an empty niche in the Court's logic. Similarly, the Court's declara-
tion of strict scrutiny in Korematsu balanced out, in a rhetorical sense, the subse-
quent analysis which resulted in virtual judicial abstention. Declarations that
Korematsu is insignificant is ultimately part of this same tradition based on wishing
that justice has, at last, been achieved. The Court's continued use of Korematsu in a
hyperbolic way serves to comfort us into assuming that the Court tried its best in the
past and will continue to do so in the future.
The failure to overrule Korematsu reflects an inability to move analytically from
a point of consensus toward issues in which there is a lack of consensus. There is a
modern consensus that it was wrongly decided. There is, however, uneasiness and
uncertainty about what meaning to attribute the case. In other words, once Kore-
matsu is overruled, what then? We should guard against oversimplification of Kore-
matsu's meaning. Indeed, even the Korematsu Court stated: "Our task would be
simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen
in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice." '3 32 While we all would agree
with the Korematsu Court on this bare statement, our disagreement results from
defining the appropriateness of the degree and place for judicial deference. The
complicated issue in Korematsu involves deciding what amount of deference, if any,
should be accorded by the Court to government authorities in times of perceived
emergency.
There are two basic approaches to answering this difficult problem. The first
approach relies on judicial deference to government authorities rather than on sub-
stantive judicial review. For example, Justice Jackson favored the creation of an un-
reviewable zone of discretion for military authorities in emergent wartime situations.
Justice Jackson advocated that this should be achieved by declaring wartime actions
by military authorities to be nonjusticiable.3 3 3 A different approach relying on a per
332. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
333. Justice Jackson took the position that civilian courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of
military judgments once they are required to evaluate their reasonableness. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 247
(Jackson, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the Court, in prior decisions, did not decide the constitutional-
ity of military judgments based on assessments of their reasonableness. The Hirabayashi Court was not
inquiring into whether there was a "'rea sonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curfew.'" Id. at
247 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (italics removed) (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101). He pointed to lan-
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se rule could forbid all racial classifications imposed by the government." 34 Those
favoring avoidance of substantive judicial review point to judicial inexpertise, practi-
cality, and the otherwise distorting effect of wartime precedent on constitutional
law.
33 5
A second approach favors judicial review. For example, although Justices Rob-
erts and Murphy emphasized that the judgment of military authorities should not be
"overruled lightly"336 they still insisted on a significant role for substantive judicial
review of judgments made by military authorities in emergencies. Justice Roberts
emphasized the importance of the Court's definition of when conditions actually
constitute an "emergency" 3 37 and in ensuring that the means are "temporary."
338
guage in Hirabayashi which indicated that the Hirabayashi Court was limiting its inquiry into whether the
curfew order "'was within the boundaries of the war power."' Id. at 247.
Justice Jackson asserted his view that civilian courts should refrain completely from making substantive
assessments of military judgments based on concerns about expertise, practicality, and the distorting effect on
constitutional law. Justice Jackson believed that, as a practical matter, civil courts lacked expertise to evaluate
the reasonableness of military actions. See id. at 244-45 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Furthermore, this military
judgment will often rest on information which may not be admissible in court or which may not be publicly
disclosed because it may compromise national security. Thus, courts may be likely to accept the bare conclu-
sions of military authorities, taking their word that there is adequate underlying information. In Korematsu,
there was "[n]o evidence" which had been introduced in "any" court on whether the military order was
reasonable. Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court had to rely on "General DeWitt's own
unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-examination ...." Id.
Because he felt that this was likely to be a common situation in these kind of cases, he concluded that
military judgment is "not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal." Id. Justice Jackson also contended that
it was "impracticable and dangerous idealism" to believe that every military order should "conform to con-
ventional tests of constitutionality." Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting). After all, "[t]he armed services must
protect society, not merely its Constitution." Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). The actions of the military in
wartime cannot be practically limited by the same constraints which are imposed on civilian authority in
peacetime. Justice Jackson noted that a reasonableness standard should not be imposed because a military
commander to be successful in wartime "may be unreasonably cautious." Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Jackson warned of the danger of subjecting military orders to a constitutional evaluation,
given that courts were likely to uphold these orders because of inexpertise and practicality. A military order,
even if mistaken, does not have the same longevity as a judicial constitutional opinion. By validating the
military order as constitutional, a precedent has been set which sanctions "racial discrimination in criminal
procedure" as well as justifying the "transplanting of American citizens" when an urgent need has been
shown. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Once established, "[t]he principle lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." Id. (Jackson,
J., dissenting). With each reuse as precedent, the principle becomes more deeply imbedded in constitutional
law and more expansive in its scope.
Justice Jackson expressed concern about the future effects of Korematsu as precedent in terms of its logic
and image. He expressed concern for the effects of its logic when he quoted Judge Cardozo in warning that
there was "'the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic."' Id. (Jackson, J., quoting
Judge Cardozo). Justice Jackson believed that this danger to logic outweighed the harm to individual liberties
if it declared the case nonjusticiable.
Not only was Justice Jackson concerned about the danger of Korematsu's logic, but he also expressed
sensitivity to the effects of the imagery of its rhetoric. Indeed, he felt that it would "wholly delusive" if
people did not understand that their only protection against the imposition of an unfair military order was
for people to prevent the "command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands ...."
Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Thus, from the perspective of Justice Jackson, it was better in the long
run to allow a military order to be issued and remain unexamined by civilian courts than for courts to "review
and approve" the order. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). To do so, transforms "a passing incident [into a]
doctrine of the Constitution" which "has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its
own image." Id. Justice Jackson believed that it was ultimately harmful to the Court for the public to
perceive that the Court's review was a mere pretense.
334. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531-32 (Stuart, J., dissenting) (interpreting the equal
protection clause as prohibiting all racial discrimination).
335. See supra note 333 (Justice Jackson's viewpoint on judicial review of military judgments).
336. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See id. at 231 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 231 n.8
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Justice Murphy contended that it was important to require a reasonable and neces-
sary relationship between the means used and the fears of sabotage and espionage.33 9
He also emphasized that "we must not exact a too high or too meticulous standard,"
given the expertise of the military and the emergency of the crisis.34° Similarly,
338. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice Roberts agreed with Justice Frankfurter that it was too artificial
to consider the exclusion separately from the forced detention since it was part of the same overall plan. Id. at
231 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The Court misconstrued the facts so that they mirrored those in Hirabayashi:
the temporary "exclusion from a given area of danger [was] made necessary by a sudden emerency." Id.
(Roberts, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Roberts conceded that, if these were the facts, he "might agree with
the court's disposition of the hypothetical case." Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). However, he conditioned his
agreement "on the definition and application of the terms 'temporary' and 'emergency."' Id. at 231 n.8
(Roberts, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he emphasized that military orders should always be subject to judi-
cial review to determine if an emergency existed and if it remained at the time of the restraint. Id. (Roberts,
J., dissenting).
Because Justice Roberts believed that the Court was confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of
the forcible detention itself, he argued that the internment was unconstitutional. He believed that the mili-
tary issued to conflicting orders which were "a cleverly devised trap ... to lock [Korematsu] up in a concen-
tration camp." Id. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Because the Court was holding that the internment was
not based on lawful statutory authority in the Endo case-which was issued on the same day as Korematsu-
Justice Roberts concluded that it violated due process for the military to have subjected Korematsu to the
two diametrically contradictory orders." Id. at 232-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
339. See 320 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
340. Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting. Justice Murphy stated that the appropriate legal standard, when
individuals are deprived of constitutional rights, was whether the governmental action was reasonably related
to the military necessity. Thus, in Korematsu, the government must show that the exclusion based on racial
ancestry was reasonably related to the "'imm ediate, imminent, and impending"' dangers of sabotage and
espionage. Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). But he concluded that this relationship was lacking because
military authorities could not show that "all persons of Japanese ancestry both alien and non-alien" had a
tendency to commit sabotage or espionage. Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (italics in original). Justice
Murphy then conducted a systematic and detailed review of the military information-especially General
DeWitt's actual justifications stated in his Final Report-which was before the Court.
At the outset of his factual analysis, Justice Murphy noted that the commanding General DeWitt had
expressed a particular "attitude toward individuals of Japanese ancestry." Id. at 236 n.2 (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing). This attitude was expressed in the General's narratives in his Final Report on the evacuation as well as
his testimony before a congressional committee. General DeWitt had labelled all persons of Japanese descent,
regardless of citizenship, as "'sub versive,' as belonging to 'an enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted,'
and as constituting 'over 112,000 potential enemies.'" Id. at 236 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting FINAL
REPORT, supra note 238, at 34).
General DeWitt's "blanket condemnation" failed to provide any reliable evidence which showed that
individuals of Japanese descent were "generally disloyal." DeWitt's prejudice toward Japanese was ultimately
expressed by his explanation of why there had been no evidence of any sabotage or espionage by persons of
Japanese descent following Pearl Harbor: "'The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a dis-
turbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken."' Id. at 241 n.15 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(quoting DEWrrr, supra note 202, at 34).
In other words, General DeWitt believed that the total lack of actual subversive activity indicated how
highly orchestrated the community of Japanese Americans were in their inactivity. Finally, the special interest
groups who were supporters of General DeWitt included white farmers who were in competition with Japa-
nese American growers. Justice Murphy quoted a leader of a white grower-shipper association as testifying
before Congress:
We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons .... We do. It's a question of
whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men .... They undersell the white
man in the markets .... They work their women and children while the white farmer has to pay
wages for his help. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks,
because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want
them back when the war ends, either.
Id. at 239 n.12 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Taylor, The People Nobody Wants, 214 SAT. EVE. PosT 24,
66 (May 9, 1942)).
After considering the "attitude" of General DeWitt and his supporters as expressed in these narratives,
Justice Murphy then turned to the specific evidence presented in the Final Report which was provided by
military authorities to justify the evacuation and internment. He characterized the evidence in the Final
Report as being based "mainly upon questionable racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the
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Justice Frankfurter offered a lesser role for judicial review when he contended that
satisfactory review should be achieved by defining what means are appropriate to
conducting war and then allowing military authorities discretion as long as they did
not exceed the defined means.
3
'
1
realm of expert military judgment, supplemented by certain semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwar-
ranted use of circumstantial evidence." Id. at 236-37 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Much of the evidence was
based on inferring danger of disloyalty from the insularity of communities of persons of Japanese ancestry.
They were depicted as having "'str ong ties of race, culture, custom and religion."' Id. at 237 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting DEWItrr).
The questioned practices included "emperor worshipping ceremonies," dual citizenship, attendance by
children of Japanese language schools, and the sending of some children to Japan for education. Id. at 237-
38 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting DEWITr, supra note 202, at 10- 11). Justice Murphy pointed out the
lack of connection between these practices by some members of the Japanese community and the likelihood
of participation in espionage and sabotage. Id. at 238 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Instead, he showed how
these practices were tied to traditional customs and the history of immigration law governing Japanese immi-
grants. Id. at 237 n.4, 6 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The insularity of the Japanese community was created by
the unavailability of non-agricultural jobs and lack of social acceptance. These factors encouraged their
geographic concentration in farming areas along the Pacific Coast, near military and industrial areas. Id. at
238 n.9 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
The Final Report also concluded that "protective custody" was necessary for those of Japanese ancestry
because the American public "'was ready to take matters into its own hands.'" Id. at 238 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting DEWITT, supra note 202, at 8-9).
In response, Justice Murphy noted the dangerousness of this forced paternalism to civil liberties of
minorities and pointed out that there was no significant factual support of this view. He observed that these
reasons echo "an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years
have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices." Indeed, he
concluded that those who had in the past expressed their prejudices in this way were "the same people who
have been among the foremost advocates of the evacuation." Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Murphy examined the reasons given by military authorities regarding their failure to
conduct individual hearings to separate the loyal from the disloyal. He observed that the military's claim that
"'tim e was of the essence"' did not comport with reality because nearly eleven months passed before comple-
tion of the internment. Id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 2124, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 247-52 (1943)). During a six-month period, the British had conducted individual hearings on approxi-
mately 74,000 German and Austrian aliens. Id. at 242 n. 16 (Murphy, J., dissenting). The fact that a coun-
try under greater duress from direct attack was able to conduct individual hearings on a similarly sized group
in a shorter time period provided a strong indication that a comparable procedure could have been estab-
lished in this country. Furthermore, given the apparent absence of a need to declare martial law and the
"[l]eisure and deliberation" which seemed to characterize the internment schedule, justice Murphy believed
that "factors of time and military necessity" were not decisive on this issue. Id. at 241 (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing). The Justice concluded that it would seem "incredible" to claim, as military authorities did, loyalty
hearings at least for the 70,000 American citizens of Japanese descent were impossible. Id. at 241-42 (Mur-
phy, J., dissenting). The fact that the military authorities did not even exempt children and the elderly from
detention indicated that the program was based on a finding of racial guilt rather than concerns about
sabotage and espionage. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Thus, Justice Murphy took the position that the Court should conduct a substantive review of whatever
information was provided by military authorities and subject it to the "reasonableness" standard. Id. at 234
(Murphy, J., dissenting). By conducting a review of the evidence made available by the military, Justice
Murphy demonstrated that such a review was at least possible to accomplish in this case. Id. at 239-40
(Murphy, J., dissenting). See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid
Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1929, 1945-46 (1991) (discussing how the Korematsu Court ignored
Justice Murphy's narrative).
341. At the outset of Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, he made it clear that he agreed with Justice
Jackson's premise that it was important to construe broadly the war powers of Congress and the President to
permit them "'to wage war successfully.'" Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93). So only if the military order "does not transcend the means appropriate for
conducting war," the courts should not deem it unconstitutional. Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Thus, for Justice Frankfurter, the Korematsu and the Hirabayashi cases were relatively easy cases to decide.
Indeed, this explains his willingness to construe the military order as requiring both exclusion and detention.
It made no difference from Justice Frankfurter's perspective. The war power gave military authorities expan-
sive discretionary power to win the war.
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The central lesson we learn from Korematsu appears to be that there is an im-
portant role for judicial review of substantive decisions by military authorities, even
if this judgment involves action labelled "temporary" and "emergency." 34 2 Because
there is a consensus that Korematsu was wrongly decided, it represents the easy case.
But the lack of consensus stems from indecision regarding how to proceed. For
example, does it necessarily follow that the Court should impose strict scrutiny on
federal affirmative action programs, as the Court concluded in Adarand, because of
distrust of all governmental racial classifications? What if anything does Korematsu
teach us about the merits of constitutional doctrine which relies heavily on the doc-
trine of judicial deference in the areas of national security and immigration?
I, for one, cannot offer definitive and detailed answers on this issue without
hearing public conversations about the advantages and dangers of alternative judicial
approaches. The existence of a current consensus that Korematsu was wrongly de-
cided serves as an opportunity to begin our public conversations in agreement, but
we should move forward to make Korematsu relevant to the modern day. We need
to connect our narratives with what we think Korematsu means. The Court should
undertake this difficult task and no longer silently avoid it. By advocating the
privileging of the interpretive-narrative link, I mean that the Court should rely on
interpretive approaches that demonstrate a connection with the meaning of Kore-
matsu. Thus, we need to acknowledge that Korematsu is living precedent.
I urge rejection of reliance on hyperbole and present absence because they serve
as a means of avoiding the elucidation of Korematsu's logical meaning. Privileging
those interpretive techniques which rely on the interpretive-narrative link means that
the Court should depend on traditional stare decisis and historical interpretation.
These interpretive techniques require the Court to assign some logical meaning to
Justice Frankfurter believed, however, that the Korematsu precedent would be confined to the process of
defining the war powers. He noted that "the validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly
in the context of war." Moreover, military authorities operated in their own separate "sphere[] of action." Id.
at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, Justice Frankfurter implied that Korematsu as precedent could be
contained within the scope of defining the war powers of government. Justice Frankfurter did not appear to
share the same fear of Korematsu's precedential impact on issues not related to national security and hence was
willing to validate the military order as constitutional under a highly deferential standard of review.
Justice Frankfurter expressed concern about what he thought was unfair imagery concerning judicial
deference to military authorities. In essence, he believed that the Court's holding should not raise questions
of legitimacy based on image, because the decision was logically correct. Justice Frankfurter pointed out the
separateness of the "spheres of action" of military authorities and of judges, and argued that the legitimacy of
action under the war power must be judged in the context of war. Id. at 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Thus, "[tihat action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless."
Id. at 224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)(emphasis added). In either instance the orders must be subject to the
bounds of the Constitution and thus are legitimate. He felt that Justice Jackson's reasoning unfairly cast "an
atmosphere of unconstitutionality" onto actions by military authorities because these were logically legiti-
mate. Finally, he concluded by emphasizing that just because "the Constitution does not forbid the military
measures now complained of does not carry with it approval of that which Congress and the Executive did.
That is their business, not ours." Id. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). By expressing substantial deference
to Congress and the President, Justice Frankfurter believed that the Court should not be tarnished because it
was not expressing social "approval" of their actions. Justice Frankfurter believed, therefore, that as long as
the Court was acting logically, it need not be concerned about imagery.
342. A different possibility would be a per se rule against all racial classifications created by the govern-
ment. This is unlikely to be a view shared by many because it departs radically from equal protection
jurisprudence. The strict scrutiny doctrine presumes that some government racial classifications will pass
muster even under the highest level of scrutiny. Such a per se rule would ban all affirmative action programs.
It would also prohibit government from relying on racial classifications in a truly temporary and emergent
way. Justice Black believed that prison authorities could separate persons by race in order to stop an outbreak
of disorder based on racial conflict within a prison. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968).
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Korematsu and to explain why it followed or, alternatively, failed to follow the prece-
dent. Instead of ignoring Korematsu in Reno and Salerno, the Court should explain
the meaning that Korematsu has with respect to its holdings. Similarly, the Court
should recognize that Korematsu stands for the principle of judicial abstention, and
ought to define the circumstances, if any, in which this should be allowable with
respect to racial classifications created by the government. This may require the
Court to acknowledge that current doctrine is consistent with Korematsu. It may
also lead the Court to distinguish Korematsu 313 or to overrule it. The Court should
also rely on historical interpretation as a legitimate means of explaining Korematsu's
historical relevance to the modern day.
If the Court adopts an approach that relies on the interpretive-narrative link-
ing, Korematsu will be overruled or narrowed considerably. I speculate that constitu-
tional law which is relevant to national security and immigration law could change
considerably because Korematsu was derived from and continues to inform these
doctrines. In any event, I believe that clarity, itself, is an important outcome which
would result if the Court offered fuller explanations about what Korematsu means in
the modern day.
The Court's failure to initiate this discussion has its costs. Judge Harry T.
Edwards recently criticized the Court's failure to "overrule or repudiate Kore-
matsu."344 He points out two problems created by this predicament from the stand-
point of a judge sitting on a federal court of appeals. First, "[t]he case stays with us,
'an evil blotch upon our national legal conscience and our law,' and each subsequent
generation's perceptions of the judicial system, its competence and its integrity, are
undoubtedly shaped accordingly. '345 Second, he believes that Korematsu continues
to have "quite tangible effects on the decisionmaking of lower courts. ' ' 34 6 For exam-
ple, a federal appellate court stated, "litigants do not have the academic luxury ... of
insisting that the Supreme Court does not really mean what it says, or that a peace-
343. The Court could distinguish Korematsu from many cases in at least four important ways. First, the
case still raised important issues about the relationship between the Court and the other branches of govern-
ment during wartime. The Jackson-Frankfurter debate in the Korematsu opinion raised difficult issues over
the judicial role in deciding issues involving the war powers. These issues include the need for national
security secrecy, the lack of the Court's expertise, and the flexibility required by the other branches to be
effective in temporary wartime emergencies. Second, the military order was promulgated not only in war-
time, but also in time of great and impending emergency. The West Coast was thought by military authori-
ties to be under imminent danger of attacks. Third, the Court furthermore noted the temporary nature of
the exclusion. The Court assumed that the exclusion would last only as long as necessary. Thus, it rested its
holding in part on the finding that, given the perceived emergency, there was insufficient time "bring about
an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal . . . ." Id. at 219. Fourth, the means used by the
government were limited to the curfew and exclusion orders. The Court contended that the Hirabayashi
precedent which validated the curfew was highly relevant to the issue of exclusion. According to the Court,
both the exclusion and the curfew bore the same "definite and close relationship to the prevention of espio-
nage and sabotage." 323 U.S. at 218. See also supra note 250. Because the Hirabayashi case was directly on
point, the Court found no need to provide additional justification for the military order. Although the Court
may have indeed been dosing its eyes to reality, the Court took the position that it was not creating new
precedent, but simply reiterating a principle enunciated in Hirabayashi. Most important, the Court clearly
avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the internment, including the detention and incarceration at assem-
bly and relocation centers.
344. Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 837, 843 (1991).
345. Id. (quoting Arval A. Morris, Justice, War, and the Japanese-American Evacuation and Internment, 59
WASH. L. REv. 843, 843 (1984)).
346. Edwards, supra note 344, at 843.
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time Court should not hesitate to repudiate a wartime Court for ignoring the Con-
stitution's requirements. ' 3 47 Thus, Judge Edwards concludes that
in cases dealing with issues as varied as pretrial preventive detention, questioning
of nonimmigrant aliens during times of international tension, mass arrests of anti-
war protestors, conscription under the Selective Service Act, and warrantless
searches during declared emergency, the [lower federal] courts are required to ad-
dress Korematsu, distinguishing it where possible and following it when necessary.
On doctrine as well as on judicial status, Korematsu continues to exert its adverse
influence. 3
48
The Court's reliance on the techniques of hyperbole and present absence pre-
serves the ambiguity created by Korematsu and leaves it to some future Court to
create its meaning. In doing so, the Court fails to provide those future Courts any
guidance as to how to approach the difficult and complex tasks of reviewing the
government's actions in time of crisis. It avoids initiating public discussion of criti-
cal issues that define the limits of judicial intervention. It leaves to a future Court to
formulate its answer to a highly complex issue without the benefit of prior public
discussion. Instead, Korematsu may remain the most important precedent on which
to rely.
EPILOGUE
Just as I favor of narratives which are connected to interpretation, I am more
responsive to narratives connected to experience, rather than abstract instruction. I
suppose this is why I find Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Korematsu, with
its emphasis on the abstract, so much less compelling than Justice Murphy's careful
examination and rejection of the actual narratives of General DeWitt and his sup-
porters. Indeed, this was why I ultimately did reject the conclusory language of my
high school textbook and teacher's glib remark. Both narratives were blunt and
unrelated to life experiences. I wish that my high school teacher could have listened
to the stories told by those who experienced the persisting racial hatred even after the
Japanese internment was abandoned.
An important role of government is to teach by its actions what we stand for as
a society. Because governmental action has such vital symbolic force, our Constitu-
tion forbids certain federal and state activities while it permits some of those very
same activities if done by private parties. In this light, the official imprimatur given
to General DeWitt's actions by a President, Congress, and the Supreme Court-
acting in concert under a banner proclaiming the importance of national unity-
gave the internment legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens. Long-lasting harm
resulted from the public's perception of the internment as a confirmation of their
ugliest fears and prejudices about Japanese Americans. A newspaper clipping in my
father's scrapbook described a poll of Californians just after the war. The poll found
that more than ninety percent of Californians did not want Japanese Americans
from the internment camps to return to their state. "NO JAPS IN CALIFORNIA"
was a common slogan. In effect, the government's forced segregation of Japanese
Americans branded us unfit for society.
The racism that persisted after the war created, for example, terrible employ-
ment problems for Japanese Americans. My father's experience was somewhat typi-
347. Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 925 (1988).
348. Id.
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cal. He described his difficulties in obtaining employment as a teacher during the
early 1950s:
During that period, there was a tremendous shortage of teachers. Some dis-
tricts in California were recruiting teachers from all parts of the Midwest and
South. Some teachers were hired by school personnel departments just on the
basis of long-distance phone calls. Housewives without credentials or degrees were
pressed into teaching duties with emergency credentials.
I traveled up and down the northern California area, seeking a teaching job,
and applied at dozens of school districts and was interviewed by scores of superin-
tendents, but was not offered a single job. This grueling ordeal has been my real
nightmare because I have had repeated dreams about it from time to time. 
4 9
Despite having two graduate degrees from ivy-league schools, a teaching cre-
dential and three years of teaching experience in Hawaii, my father was able to
obtain his single offer of employment at a junior high school in Merced, California,
only after having to go before the local school board for approval of his "character."
To his knowledge, no other teacher in that school system ever had to go before that
board for such approval.
The heightened prejudice against Japanese Americans resulting from the intern-
ment endured for decades. My own childhood memories of the early 1960s are
infected with recollections of residual racial hatred from the war. When I was at-
tending first and second grades in Merced, I remember every morning having to run
as fast as I could to my classroom because I was greeted by taunts of "dirty Jap" from
a group of boys waiting for me at the school yard gate. These were the sons of Air
Force personnel at a nearby base. As a child and adolescent I tried to ignore this
kind of baiting because this was what my parents did.
Racist epithets like "dirty Jap" are especially frustrating because they invite a
fight, not rational conversation. They represent a mean, ugly catharsis by the
speaker without leaving room for constructive discourse. One response to racist
epithets, I suppose, is the slinging back of epithets. While this response may be
cathartic, such counter expression does not invite conversations that may lead to
change. Based on similar reasoning, I advocate privileging those interpretive meth-
ods used by judges that create the possibility of conversation and reflection-ex-
changes that may lead to change. This means privileging Justice O'Connor's
interpretation in Croson because it was based on Korematsu's historical meaning. Her
court opinion in Croson held that the City of Richmond's affirmative action pro-
gram, which encouraged racial diversity in the construction industry, is analogous to
what the government did in Korematsu.35 0 I think that the interpretation should be
privileged, not because it is neccessarily the correct one, but because it should be
debated. I am eager to begin discussions about what the Japanese internment should
mean in the modern day. I am confident that such a discussion will prove that
Justice O'Connor in Croson derived the wrong lesson from history. Maybe I am
wrong. But let us learn from history by openly and honestly debating it.
In declaring Korematsu to be living precedent, I recognize that my view is at
odds with the position taken thus far by leaders of the Japanese American commu-
nity. I understand their wishes and desires to declare Korematsu dead, especially
after the successes of the restitution movement and the coram nobis litigations. But I
fear that there is a great danger in forgetting what should not be forgotten. I believe
349. Hashimoto, supra note 23, at 9.
350. 488 U.S. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that it is safer to be honest and recognize Korematsu's continued perpetuation as
doctrine than to prematurely declare the conclusion of a noble cause. Korematsu's
persistance, as legal precedent and as a memory of the internment itself, must serve
to remind us to be vigilant in protecting our civil liberties.
More than fifty years later, the internment of Japanese Americans may seem
like ancient history to many Americans. In some ways it is. But I cannot help
recalling the conversation I had with Justice William Brennan when I clerked for
him after law school. The Justice was preparing a speech to deliver to a group of
Israeli officials who had asked him to comment on the preservation of human liber-
ties during America's wars. I asked Justice Brennan what he planned to say. He
answered in the gravest tones, saying that he was going to tell them that he hoped
Israel learned from the American experience not to emulate it.
